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Questions of medical treatment for incompetent patients raise
difficult policy issues about the meaning and value of human life.
Should bedridden or minimally functional patients who suffer from
the effects of a coma, a stroke, Alzheimer's disease and other ills be
treated? Do they have interests that need protection? How should
such choices be made?
These questions are troubling because they pit fundamental val-
ues against each other. Human life, even in severely diminished
states, seems precious. We recoil at the idea that the sick and de-
pendent will be discarded because of the inconvenience they cause.
* A-B., Dartmouth College, 1964; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1968. Thomas Watt Gregory
Professor of Law, School of Law, The University of Texas at Austin. The author is grateful
to the University of Georgia School of Law's Sibley Lectureship and the University of Texas
School of Law for the support that made it possible to write this Article, and to my col-
league Jordan Steiker for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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Yet we also believe that existence in certain marginal states may
be meaningless and feel strongly that patients and their families
should not be prisoners of medical technology that serves no cura-
tive purpose. How then may we chart a course that respects depen-
dent persons and yet limits excessive medical interventions?
Physicians, ethicists, courts and legislatures have made substan-
tial progress in answering this question since 1975, when In re
Quinlan first put it squarely on the public agenda.1 The prevailing
consensus is that the ethical and legal principle of autonomy
should control these decisions whenever possible. It is now widely
accepted-and recognized in judicial decisions and legisla-
tion-that a competent patient's refusal of treatment or directive
against treatment if he becomes incompetent should be honored.2
Treatment questions, however, are much more difficult when the
patient is incompetent and has not previously issued an explicit
directive against treatment. In the case of an incompetent patient,
questions of the value of that patient's life inevitably arise. Should
the patient be regarded as the person she was previously, with the
decision most consistent with her prior beliefs and values then in-
ferred? If such substituted judgment by family or proxy is not per-
mitted, should the patient always be treated? Or should treatment
decisions be made on the basis of the incompetent patient's mental
status and current interests, with treatment withheld if the patient
appears to have no substantial interest in further existence? What
role should family, financial and more general societal concerns
play in these choices? 3
The policy choices for treatment of incompetent patients may be
viewed as points on a continuum between a vitalist and a nonvital-
ist position. From the vitalist perspective, all human life is viewed
as worthy of protection regardless of its quality or functional abil-
ity.4 In the most extreme form, even competent choices to refuse
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
2 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVORIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMSJ.
The precise limits of this understanding-and its constitutional status-are unclear. See
infra Part IV(B).
' The answer usually given is that these concerns should play no role at all, although they
often do in unacknowledged ways. For further discussion, see infra Part V(A)(3).
Many extreme vitalists would include prenatal human life as well and require protection
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treatment and competently made prior directives must be ignored
due to the importance of human life." A somewhat less extreme
position would require treatment whenever a competent refusal or
explicit directive against treatment was missing, regardless of the
condition of the patient or wishes of the family.0
The opposite or nonvitalist pole of the continuum regards
human life as worth protecting only if that life meets certain mini-
mal standards of functional ability. Thus, prenatal life that lacks a
developed brain or functional ability or postnatal life that is
merely metabolic or biologic, such as the permanently comatose,
need not be sustained or protected.7 Nonvitalists are also prepared
to assess whether conscious, noncomatose patients have meaning-
ful interests in being treated. They accept quality of life judg-
ments, either directly or through recognition of prior directives or
proxy inferences of what the patient would have chosen." Nonvital-
ists would also allow treatment to be withheld in some marginal
cases to serve family, economic and societal interests.
Legal and policy issues in treatment of incompetent patients
thus pose the question of where on the vitalist-nonvitalist contin-
uum to locate public policy. As the brief discussion above shows,
however, the policy question is rarely addressed directly in these
terms. Instead, policy questions are usually mediated-or ob-
scured-by a focus on personal autonomy. For example, a public
policy that relies heavily on the existence of a competent patient's
advance directive against treatment if she becomes incompetent
may often lead to nonvitalist results, not because the incompetent
of fertilized eggs, embryos and fetuses. In some states, anti-abortion groups have also op-
posed legislation allowing nontreatment of incompetent persons. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1991, § 1, at 12, col. 5.
5 Some vitalists would find it wrong to allow competent persons to refuse medical treat-
ment and would insist on treatment against the patient's wishes.
6 A vitalist would also be skeptical about the validity of a prior directive against treat-
ment, especially if an incompetent patient appeared to have interests in continued life. See
infra Part IV(B)(2).
I have argued that fetuses themselves have no rights or interests prior to viability be-
cause they lack the neural substrate upon which the very concept of having interests de-
pends. See Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA L Ray.
437, 441-44 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, In the Beginning].
8 By looking at prior choices, this position devalues the patient's current status. Nonvital-
ists are thus likely to demand few procedural protections for the making of a living will.
They are also likely to accept prior oral statements as sufficient evidence of the patient's
wishes, as the family argued in the Cruzan case. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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patient has no interest in treatment, but because a previously ex-
pressed autonomous choice requires it. At the same time, in the
absence of directives, a state may be rigidly vitalist, not because
the patient's interests are thereby best served, but because the
prior choice against treatment is missing.
The tendency to recast decisions about incompetent patients as
questions of prior autonomy, rather than to assess directly the
worth of the patient's life, is most evident when an incompetent
patient has not issued a prior directive to guide current decisions.
Most courts faced with this question remain wedded to personal
autonomy and require that proxies determine what the patient, if
competent, would .have decided about the choice before her.0 In
many instances such substituted judgment is nonvitalist because it
usually leads the proxy decisionmaker to find that the patient, if
competent, would have decided against treatment.
Some courts, however, take a more vitalist approach and require
that, unless there is explicit evidence of a prior directive, the pa-
tient must be treated.10 Such courts usually require clear and con-
vincing evidence that the patient would have chosen nontreatment,
a burden which may often be difficult to meet. In either case, how-
ever, courts have not decided questions solely in terms of the in-
competent patient's current interests, thereby avoiding direct as-
sessments of the worth or value of the diminished life before
them."
' Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1987) (holding by
means of substituted judgment that patient in persistent vegetative state would have, if
competent, discontinued the artificial maintenance of his nutrition and hydration); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (holding that probate judge, on petition of
ward's wife and son, appropriately decided that treatment should be withheld because ward,
if competent, would elect not to receive treatment).
"0 In re Westchester County Med. Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d
886 (1988) (holding that hospital was authorized to insert nasogastic feeding tube into eld-
erly, mentally incompetent patient who was unable to obtain food and drink without medi-
cal assistance in the absence of clear and convincing proof that patient had made firm and
settled commitment, while competent, to decline assistance).
" An exception to the general rule exists, however, when the patient was never competent
because a previously competent choice cannot then be inferred. Despite this difficulty, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court inferred such a choice in Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Conversely, the New York
Court of Appeals refused to do so in In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). Although the results of these two cases differ dramatically, both cases
involved mentally retarded persons who had never been competent.
[Vol. 25:11391142
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The problems with eschewing a direct assessment of the pa-
tient's interest in continued living are clearest in these cases, for
neither approach is satisfactory. The first approach, which usually
leads to nonvitalist results, risks sacrificing the patient's current
interests to the imputed choice of a previously competent self
whose situation and interests have changed radically. The effect of
this position is to privilege the interests and views of the family or
other proxy making the substituted choice over the incompetent
patient's current interests.12
On the other hand, the second, explicitly vitalistic approach ref-
uses to acknowledge that continued existence might not be in the
interest of an incompetent patient whose consciousness and ability
to relate to others has deteriorated. While such vitalism ostensibly
protects human life, it does so blindly and without attention to the
reality of the patient's situation. A direct assessment of that situa-
tion might reveal that, given the patient's debilitated condition,
her interests in further treatment are so marginal that treatment is
a burden that cannot be justified."3
Unfortunately, public policy will likely continue to rely heavily
on actual or inferred exercises of autonomy to determine positions
on the vitalist-nonvitalist continuum. Such an approach is funda-
mentally flawed because it refuses to address directly the central
question of how to value or respect incompetent patients as they
are now. Attempts to approach the incompetent patient through
the lens of autonomy ignores the reality of the incompetent patient
as a nonautonomous individual. Reliance on prior directives in that
situation, while not always disrespectful of the incompetent pa-
tient's current interests, risks protecting previous interests rather
than current ones.1 4 Reliance on substituted judgment in the ab-
sence of an explicit directive commits the same error, while a re-
fusal to permit nontreatment in the absence of an explicit directive
risks the error of maintaining incompetent patients whose interests
would be best served by nontreatment.
In my view, the most defensible policies will result only if deci-
12 This is not to say that courts or commentators taking this position are consciously or
intentionally privileging these interests over those of the incompetent patient or that non-
treatment always disserves those patients' interests.
13 Dresser & Robertson, Quality of Life and Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent
Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 LAw. MED. & Hmvri Cmw 234 (1989).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 154-55 & 182-83.
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sionmakers directly address the worth or value of severely dimin-
ished life on its own terms-that is, from the perspective of the
now incompetent patient.15 In other words, the key question in
every case is whether the patient, from her own perspective, has
interests that are best served by treatment and further life or non-
treatment and her likely demise. Although implementing such an
approach has its own difficulties, it has the great virtue of asking
the right question because it recognizes that the decision affects
the incompetent patient as she now is, not as she previously was.10
A useful way to approach these issues is through the 1990 Su-
preme Court decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, the Supreme Court's first attempt to come to terms
with the issues raised by the nontreatment of incompetent pa-
tients.17 In this case, the state of Missouri took an extreme vitalist
position regarding the treatment of an irreversibly comatose pa-
tient who had not made an explicit directive against treatment.
Missouri insisted that Nancy Cruzan's life, whatever its quality or
level of functioning, be protected despite the anguish caused her
family and the lack of discernible benefit to her.18
Her parents, on the other hand, took a nonvitalist position,
which they articulated in the language of autonomy. Finding no
benefit to Nancy Cruzan from continued maintenance in her coma-
tose state, they claimed that when she was competent she had or
would have chosen not to be maintained in that state. The case
became constitutionally significant because the Cruzans argued
that the state's vitalist position violated their daughter's and their
own fundamental constitutional rights.
The Court rejected this claim, thus permitting the state to re-
quire continued maintenance of Nancy Cruzan in her comatose
state notwithstanding her parents' objections. While recognizing
constitutional limits on the state's power to override a competent
" This approach is not without its own pitfalls, but in my judgement it is preferable to
existing alternatives. See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13; infra note 204.
"S See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13; infra text accompanying notes 154-55 & 182-
83.
17 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
'8 On December 26, 1990, Nancy Cruzan died after a Missouri judge ruled that her feed-
ing tube could be removed based on new evidence that Nancy Cruzan would not have con-
sented to further treatment. Lewin, Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by a Debate Over the
Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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person's refusal of medical treatment, the Court gave states wide
discretion to adopt vitalist policies in decisions concerning incom-
petent patients.19 In reaching this result, the Court demonstrated
many of the errors and potential flaws to which the dominant em-
phasis on autonomy with incompetent patients leads.
This Article analyzes the Court's decision in Cruzan and evalu-
ates the constitutional limits that apply to treatment decisions for
incompetent patients. Although Missouri should not have required
further treatment of Nancy Cruzan, the Court acted soundly in
finding that this position was constitutionally permissible. The
Court, however, never recognized the conflict that might arise be-
tween the interests of the currently incompetent patient and the
interests of the patient when she was competent. A direct assess-
ment of the incompetent patient's current interests clarifies many
debates about nontreatment and will lead to sounder and more
honest policy results. In analyzing these questions, the value
choices at stake in these agonizing situations and the constitutional
limits on state, family and patient authority will become clear.
I. THE FACTS AND LOWER COURT DECISION IN CRUZAN
The facts and lower court decision in Cruzan aid in the assess-
ment of Cruzan and the role of constitutional limitations on state
lawmaking for incompetent patients.
A. The Facts of Cruzan
On the night of January 11, 1983, Nancy Cruzan lost control of a
car she was driving and landed in a ditch.20 Paramedics found her
without detectable respiratory or cardiac function, restored her
breathing at the accident site and transferred her to a hospital in
an unconscious state. Neurosurgeons estimated that she was with-
out oxygen for approximately twelve or fourteen minutes, clearly
more than the six minutes of anoxia that generally causes perma-
nent brain damage.21
" Thus, Cruzan is hardly a decisive defeat for a constitutional "right to die." In fact, it
may turn out to be a great victory for the competent patients rights' over the dying process.
See infra text accompanying note 121.
20 This summary of facts is taken from the Court's opinion in Cruzan, 110 S. CL at 2844-
47.
21 Id. at 2845 (noting trial court's finding that "permanent brain damage generally results
after six minutes in an anoxic state").
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After approximately three weeks in a coma, she progressed to an
unconscious state in which she was able orally to ingest some food.
In order to facilitate feeding, surgeons implanted a gastrostomy
feeding and hydration tube in Cruzan with the consent of her hus-
band. Her condition never improved. She remained in a Missouri
state hospital in a persistent vegetative state: a condition in which
a person exhibits motor reflexes but shows no signs of significant
cognitive function.2 The state of Missouri bore the cost of her
care.
23
After Nancy Cruzan remained comatose for many months, it be-
came apparent that she had no chance of regaining her mental fac-
ulties. Her parents, who had been appointed her guardians, asked
hospital employees to terminate the artificial hydration and nutri-
tion procedures, an act which would have resulted in her death.
When they refused to act without court approval, the Cruzans
sought and received authorization from a state trial court for ter-
mination. The court found that a person in Nancy's condition had
a fundamental right under the state and federal constitutions to
refuse or direct the withdrawal of "death prolonging procedures. 2 4
The court also found that Nancy's "expressed thoughts at age
12 The Court quoted the following description of a persistent vegetative state by Dr. Fred
Plum, the creator of the term: " 'Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning
entirely in terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat
and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of
muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavorial evidence
of either self-awareness or the surroundings in a learned manner.'" In re Jobes, 108 N.J.
394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987).
It is generally considered that persons in such states cannot feel pain. The Missouri Su-
preme Court, adopting much of the trial court's findings, however, described her condition
as follows:
... (3) she suffered anoxia of the brain resulting in a massive enlargement of
the cerebral ventricles filling with cerebrospinal fluid in the area where her
brain has degenerated and her cerebral cortical activity is irreversible, perma-
nent, progressive and ongoing; (4) her highest cognitive brain function is exhib-
ited by her grimacing perhaps in recognition of ordinarily painful stimuli, in-
dicating the experience of pain and apparent responses to sound; (5) she is a
spastic quadriplegic; (6) her four extremities are contracted with irreversible
muscular and tendon damage to all extremities.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (emphasis added). If she was
indeed experiencing pain, she would have had a strong interest in having treatment stopped.
See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Because Justice Stevens was the only justice who
emphasized this fact, it should not be taken as established.
13 Lewin, supra note 18, at 1.
24 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
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twenty-five in somewhat serious conversation with a housemate
friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her
life unless she could live at least halfway normally suggests that
given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with
her nutrition or hydration. '25
B. Missouri Supreme Court Decision
The guardian ad litem appointed to represent Nancy in this pro-
ceeding agreed that withdrawal of nutrition and hydration was in
Nancy's best interests but felt bound to bring this case of first im-
pression to the state's highest court.
In that proceeding, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed by a
divided vote.26 While finding a common-law right to refuse medical
treatment, the court declined to find a broad right of privacy in
either the state or federal constitution that would cover the situa-
tion before it. Finding a strong state policy in favor of the preser-
vation of life, whatever its quality, the court found that Nancy
Cruzan's statements to her roommate were "unreliable for the pur-
pose of determining her intent.., and thus insufficient to support
the co-guardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on her be-
half. '2 7 It rejected the argument that Cruzan's parents were enti-
tled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding
that "no person can assume that choice for an incompetent in the
absence of the formalities required under Missouri's living will
statutes or the clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence
absent here. '28
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
whether the Missouri court's requirements and decision violated
Cruzan's constitutional rights:29 did she have a right under the
United States Constitution which would require the hospital to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from her under these
circumstances?
25 Id.
2'6 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
27 Id. at 424-26.
28 Id. at 425.
29 Crzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
ruling.30 Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion for five members of the
Court, defined the issue as whether the Constitution allows Mis-
souri to require that a patient's competent wish to have treatment
stopped be shown by the clear and convincing evidence which the
Missouri court had found lacking on the record before it.
A. Majority Opinion
In finding that Missouri's rule was constitutional, the majority
appeared to share the dissent's and the petitioner's assumptions
about the right of competent persons to refuse treatment and to
issue advance directives against treatment when incompetent. The
Court noted that "the principle that a competent person has a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medi-
cal treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."3 1 The
Court recognized that this liberty interest must be balanced
against relevant state interests. Without deciding how the balanc-
ing would come out if a competent adult refused nutrition and hy-
dration, the Court stated that, "for purposes of this case, we as-
sume that the... Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition. '32
The situation in Cruzan, however, did not involve a competent
adult who was asking that treatment be withheld. The Court re-
jected the claim that "an incompetent person should possess the
same right in this respect as is possessed by a competent person,"
noting that "an incompetent person is not able to make an in-
formed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to re-
fuse treatment or any other right."3 3 "Such a 'right' must be exer-
cised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate."34
Missouri permitted the surrogate to decide for the incompetent
11 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2841 (1990).
31 Id. at 2851.
2 Id. at 2852.
33 Id.
31 Id. The question of whether an incompetent patient has the right to have a surrogate
make a decision for her if she has given no specific intstructions or otherwise appointed the
surrogate or whether she merely has the right to have her interests in her incompetent situ-
ation protected is discussed infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
[Vol. 25:11391148
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patient only if the surrogate's decision "conforms as best it may to
the wishes expressed by the patient while competent." 3 To that
end, the state required that "evidence of the incompetent's wishes
as to the withdrawal of treatment be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence," a burden which the Cruzans were not able to meet.30
The Court upheld this requirement because of Missouri's legiti-
mate interest "in the protection and preservation of human life,"
an interest long recognized in laws against homicide and assisting
suicide.37 Moreover, the Court indicated that the state's interest is
more particular than merely protecting life. Since the choice be-
tween life and death is "a deeply personal decision of obvious and
overwhelming finality... Missouri may legitimately seek to safe-
guard the personal element of this choice through the imposition
of heightened evidentiary requirements." 38
Because some incompetent patients may not have family availa-
ble to serve as surrogates and because some families have compet-
ing interests in that role, the Court held that a state is entitled "to
guard against abuses in such a situation."39 Moreover, the state
may impose procedural or evidentiary requirements to protect its
interest and the patient's inferred interest in life because even a
judicial proceeding to determine an incompetent patient's wishes
3' Cruzan, 100 S. Ct. at 2852.
36 Id. This standard assumes that the decision should be based on what the patient had
chosen when competent but sets a heavy standard for determining that choice. A different
approach would require determining which decision will serve the patient's interests or wel-
fare as she now exists. See infra Part V(A)(2).
'3 Cruzan, 110 S. CL at 2852-53. The Court stated: "We do not think that a State is
required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physi-
cally-able adult to starve to death." Id. In this passage, Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to
address Justice Scalia's claim that the liberty interest or right recognized by the Court
would allow a physically able person to commit suicide by starving himself to death. See
infra text accompanying note 55; see also In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 232, 480 A.2d 93, 97
(1984) (rejecting inmate's claim that he had a constitutional right to die where he was not
facing death from illness). As noted below, the Court's asserted distinction with starvation
would not distinguish cases of refusing medical care where a physically able person can be
restored to a normal, healthy existence. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58
N.J. 576, 581-87, 279 A.2d 670, 672-73 (1971) (ordering transfusion where failure to adminis-
ter blood transfusion would have resulted in patient's death and where patient's mother
rejected transfusion on religious grounds).
" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53. The Court noted, "the Due Process clause protects an
interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-saving medical treatment-," Id. at 2853.
39 Id. at 2853.
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may not be truly adversarial.40 In any event, the State is not re-
quired to make judgments about the quality of life of individual
patients and may "simply assert an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitution-
ally protected interests of the individual." '41
The Court then found that Missouri "permissibly sought to ad-
vance these interests through the adoption of a 'clear and convinc-
ing' standard of proof to govern proceedings to determine what the
patient had chosen when competent. ' 42 Given the importance of
the interests at issue, the state acts reasonably in nontreatment
cases when it requires a higher degree of confidence than it does in
an ordinary civil dispute involving the transfer of money. The
Court noted:
We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an in-
creased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to
terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining
treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate results
in maintenance of the status quo .... An erroneous deci-
sion to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is
not susceptible of correction.43
The Court found that the evidence adduced at trial regarding
Nancy Cruzan's prior wishes did not meet the state's clear and
convincing standard. Although the trial court had found that the
evidence "suggested that Nancy would not have desired to con-
tinue such measures," that court had not assessed the evidence
under a clear and convincing standard." Given that this evidence
40 Id. at 2854.
4' Id. at 2853.
42 Id. at 2853-54. The Missouri position assumes, of course, that the only ground for with-
holding treatment from an incompetent patient is a prior, competent clear expression of a
wish against treatment. This position overlooks the possibility of nontreatment that is nec-
essary to advance or serve the patient's current interests. For a discussion of the constitu-
tionality of such a position, see infra Part IV(C).
" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854. The Court bolstered this point by noting that most states
forbid oral testimony in certain contract cases, which are of lesser importance than a deci.
sion to terminate a patient's life. Thus, the parol evidence rule and statute of frauds in wills
might also frustrate the wishes of decedents, just as this one might "have frustrated the
effectuation of the not-fully expressed desires of Nancy Cruzan." Id. One could argue, how-
ever, that in Nancy Cruzan's case the fundamental right at stake was of greater personal
significance than the liberty interest in making contracts.
" Id. at 2855. The trial court did not know that a clear and convincing standard of cer-
1150 [Vol. 25:1139
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did not address nutrition and hydration and the remarks were
made in conversation to a housemate, it was not clear constitu-
tional error for the Missouri Supreme Court to find that the clear
and convincing test was not satisfied.
The final point the Court addressed was the claim that Missouri
must accept the "substituted judgment of close family members
even in the absence of substantial proof that their views reflect the
views of the patient."45 The Court rejected this claim. Cases such
as Parham4" and Michael H.47 allow states to rely on family deci-
sionmaking, but they do not require that family choice always con-
trols. 4s Thus, the Constitution does not require the "State to re-
pose judgment in these matters with anyone but the patient
herself. ' 49 Indeed, the Court recognized the possibility of inaccu-
rate or conflicting assessments of the patient's wishes by the
family:
Close family members may have a strong feeling-a feel-
ing not at all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disin-
terested, either-that they do not wish to witness the
continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard
as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading. But there
is no automatic assurance that the view of close family
members will necessarily be the same as the patient's
would have been had she been confronted with the pros-
pect of her situation while competent .... [T]he State
may choose to defer only to the patient's wishes rather
than confide the decision to close family membersa °
In sum, the Court held that the state may choose decisionmak-
tainty was required because the Missouri Supreme Court announced this standard after
appeal of the trial court's decision. When the Cruzans reopened the case, the court found
that the evidence of Nancy Cruzan's prior wishes did meet this standard. See supra note 18.
" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
"6 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that the risk of error inherent in parental
decision to leave child institutionalized for mental health care is sufficently great that some
kind of inquiry should be made by a neutral "factfinder" to determine whether statutory
requirements for admission are satisfied).
"' Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (stating that state's interest in protecting
the integrity of the family outweighed petitioner's right to demonstrate his paternity of a
child born into a marriage), reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 22 (1989).
48 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
49 Id.
10 Id. at 2855-56.
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ing procedures for incompetent, comatose patients that require
clear evidence of the wishes of the patient when she was compe-
tent.5 Such a rigorous showing does not violate a competent pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment nor does treatment harm the co-
matose patient. Additionally, the family possesses no independent
right to decide the matter. Thus, the state may constitutionally
choose to protect even vegetative human life because doing so, as
illustrated by Cruzan, violates no one's constitutional rights.
B. Concurring Opinions
Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined the opinion of the Court but
added their own views. Justice O'Connor's concurrence articulated
two points. She discussed more fully why refusal of medical treat-
ment, including nutrition and hydration, is a protected liberty in-
terest.52 She also noted that the right to refuse medical treatment
should logically include the right to appoint surrogate deci-
sionmakers who can refuse treatment for incompetent patients' 3
Justice Scalia wrote separately to argue that any constitutional
pronouncement is likely to confuse state legislative efforts because
neither the Constitution nor the Justices have any special insight
into these matters."' He strongly criticized the Court's conclusion
that the liberty clause protects a competent adult's right to refuse
necessary medical care. He equated such a right with a right to
commit suicide, a right not "historically and traditionally pro-
tected against state interference." '55 Scalia's concurring opinion
placed no limits on a state's rejection of a patient's refusal of artifi-
cial feeding and nutrition.5
" Because Cruzan involved an incompetent, comatose patient, it is not clear that the
holding would extend to incompetent, noncomatose patients. As noted below, such a posi.
tion could violate the rights of such patients when they have present interests in nontreat-
ment, regardless of prior directives against treatment. See infra Part IV(C).
"2 Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952)).
" Id. at 2857 (citing Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtained from Families of
Adult Patients to Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 229, 230
(1987)).
" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2860.




In Cruzan, Justices Brennan and Stevens wrote long dissenting
opinions. Their arguments are briefly summarized here, and their
substantive points are more fully discussed in the analysis of
Cruzan that follows.
1. Justice Brennan's Dissent. Justice Brennan's dissent, joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, started with the assumption
that patients who do not want a life sustained only by technology
have a right to "die with dignity" free of such technology. 7 If com-
petent, they have a fundamental right to refuse medical technology
that would keep them alive, subject only to state restrictions that
satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny.58
Incompetency does not deprive a person of fundamental rights. 9
The fact of incompetency, however, may "adjust the manner" in
which rights are exercised by those "unable to exercise choice
freely and rationally," for example, by requiring that they be exer-
cised by agents "acting with the best interests of their principals in
mind., 60
Justice Brennan made several different arguments for halting
treatment of Nancy Cruzan. He argued that when she was compe-
tent, she had in fact decided against treatment, a fact which the
state's unreasonably high and biased standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence prevented from being recognized.6 Even if she
had not issued a prior directive, she had a right not to be treated if
her family found that she would have chosen to forgo treatment
when competent.6 2 While recognizing that she lacked any meaning-
57 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rasmussen v. Fleming,
154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987) (en banc)).
I Id. at 2864. Justice Brennan gave the right to refuse medical care a much firmer foun-
dation than the majority and would extend it to incompetent patients. He noted that, if
there is a liberty interest to be free of unwanted medical care, then it must be part of a
fundamental right against unwanted bodily intrusions. Moreover, he noted that this right
exists, even if serious consequences such as death result from its exercise. Delivery of artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration is merely a form of intrusive medical treatment which a person
has a constitutional right to refuse.
59 Id. at 2867.
60 Id. at 2867 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)).
61 Id. at 2869-71.
12 Id. at 2877. He would grant the family, rather than the state, the power to decide when
the choice that the patient "would make" cannot be determined. In that case "a state must
generally either repose the choice with the person whom the patient himself would most
likely have chosen as proxy or leave the decision to the patient's family." Id. at 2877-78.
11531991]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
ful interests in continued life, Justice Brennan also argued that
maintaining her by gastrostomy feeding may have actually hurt
her. s Finally, his dissent questioned whether the state's interest in
preservation of life is legitimate in a case where the patient has
only a metabolic existence, devoid of "thought, emotion and sensa-
tion."64 He noted:
[T]he state has no legitimate general interest in some-
one's life, completely abstracted from the interest of the
person living that life, that could outweigh the person's
choice to avoid medical treatment .... Thus, the state's
general interest in life must accede to Nancy Cruzan's
particularized and intense interest in self-determination
in her choice of medical treatment.6 5
2. Justice Stevens' Dissent. Justice Stevens wrote a long dissent
full of philosophical reflections that paid less attention to prior di-
rectives and the standards by which they are established than they
paid to Nancy Cruzan's best interests. He argued repeatedly that
treatment in these circumstances violated her rights because a de-
cision to treat her ignored her best interests.6 6 At times, Stevens
based this judgment on the finding of the guardian ad litem and
the trial judge that withdrawing treatment would be in her best
interests.6 7 At other times, he argued that her interests included
"how she will be thought of after her death by those whose opin-
ions mattered to her."' s
Justice Stevens also criticized the state's claimed interest in the
preservation of life. He argued that the state was actually defining
63 Id. at 2868-69 (describing the damage that can occur to the patient's body as a result of
the delivery of artificial nutrition and hydration through a gastrostomy tube).
" Id. at 2868.
Id. at 2870.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2882, 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 2882. Justice Stevens extensively quoted Missouri Supreme Court Justice Black.
mar's dissenting opinion in support of the contention that she may have been in pain:
"There is evidence that Nancy may react to pain stimuli. If she has any awareness of her
surroundings, her life must be a living hell." Id. If she is truly comatose, however, it Is
difficult to understand how she can feel pain or have any interests at all. See inlra text
accompanying notes 78-81.
11 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2885-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Many other similar statements
are found throughout the opinion: "How she dies will affect how [she] is remembered," id.
at 2886; "an interest in having their memories of her filled predominately with thoughts
about her past vitality rather than her current condition," id. at 2892.
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the meaning of life, rather than attempting to preserve its sanctity,
when decisions regarding this definition should be left to the pri-
vacy of patient or family."" He emphasized the point that the pa-
tient's best interests, including her right to be remembered as a
person of vitality, must control. Stevens wrote: "[T]he meaning
and completion of her life should be controlled by persons who
have her best interests at heart-not by a state legislature con-
cerned only with the 'preservation of human life.' "0 He thus
viewed the state as trying to make an example of Nancy Cruzan
and ignoring her own well-being:
However commendable may be the State's interest in
human life, it cannot pursue that interest by appropriat-
ing Nancy Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes.
Lives do not exist in abstraction from persons, and to
pretend otherwise is not to honor but to desecrate the
State's responsibility for protecting life. 1
III. EVALUATION OF THE DECISION: CRUZAN WAS CORRECTLY
DECIDED
Cruzan involved a family caught in an agonizing situation that
cried out for relief. The Cruzans' daughter's life had effectively en-
ded, even though she could have remained curled in a comatose
position in a state institution for years. Except for Missouri, every
state that had considered the matter would have allowed medical
treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, to be with-
held from an irreversibly comatose patient.72 The vast majority of
people, no doubt, would support the family's decision in these
circumstances.73
Despite these compelling circumstances, Missouri law did not al-
low medical treatment to be terminated when there is no clear evi-
'" Id. at 2886-87.
70 Id. at 2892.
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.L 1988); Foody v. Manchester Memo-
rial Hosp., 40 Conn. Sup. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); In
re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
71 The exception is persons who hold strong right-to-life views and connect this situation
with the debate over abortion. See infra note 174.
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dence that the patient had issued a directive against treatment
when competent because of its policy to protect all human life, re-
gardless of its quality or functional ability.7 4
Missouri's extreme vitalist posture toward Nancy Cruzan cannot
be justified as a matter of ethics or policy. She had lost the capac-
ity to have interests and thus gained nothing from continued life,
while treatment caused her family continual suffering.7 5 Withhold-
ing artificial nutrition and hydration from comatose patients like
Nancy Cruzan has few symbolic costs. It would not diminish re-
spect for human life and poses little threat of a slippery slope to
more extreme nonvitalist scenarios.
Notwithstanding the fact that Missouri's position was ethically
questionable, the Supreme Court's decision upholding this posture
was correct as a matter of constitutional law. A vitalist position
toward comatose patients in Nancy Cruzan's circumstances cannot
easily be shown to violate the patient's or her family's constitu-
tional rights.
In justifying this conclusion, I examine several grounds offered
to justify the claim that Missouri's requirement of gastrostomy
feeding violated Nancy's or her parents' fundamental constitu-
tional rights. I first examine the claim that the state violated
Nancy's rights and then discuss the rights of the family to have
treatment discontinued.
A. Nancy Cruzan's Fundamental Rights Were Not Violated
The question here is whether requiring gastrostomy feeding of
an irreversibly comatose patient who has no cognitive life violates
that patient's fundamental rights. This question might be re-
phrased: does an irreversibly comatose patient have a right not to
be treated or a right to die when she has not made an explicit di-
rective against treatment? The Cruzans and various amici curaie
claimed that treatment directly violated Nancy Cruzan's right to
refuse medical treatment-or her right to die-because it ignored
her best interests. Consideration of the several strands of this
claim will demonstrate that the Court correctly rejected these
claims.
" See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
' The Missouri policy did not serve her interests because she no longer had interests to
be served, even if she would not have been hurt by continued treatment.
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1. She Was Not Refusing Treatment. The strongest support for
a claim that a state requirement of treatment violates a patient's
fundamental rights-including the patient's right to die-arises
when a competent adult refuses the present administration of life-
saving treatment. The basis for such a right and its scope are dis-
cussed in detail below. 6 For present purposes, it is sufficient to
note that Nancy Cruzan was not competent and had not refused
gastrostomy feeding or other medical treatment because her coma-
tose condition rendered her incapable of refusing treatment or ex-
ercising choice in any way.
2. Gastrostomy Feeding Did Not Harm Her. Treatment of an
incompetent patient might also be unconstitutional if it harmed
the patient, for example by injuring her or reducing her interests
significantly without sufficient justification . The petitioners ar-
gued that gastrostomy feeding harmed Nancy Cruzan. In Justice
Stevens' words, Missouri's action was unconstitutional because it
hurt or overwhelmed "her own best interests. 78
The difficulty with this argument is that it appears to have no
application to irreversibly comatose patients such as Nancy
Cruzan. Irreversibly comatose patients, by definition, have no in-
terests in their present condition, because they lack the mental
substrate essential to the possession of interests. As Justice Bren-
nan noted, Nancy Cruzan had a metabolic existence only, with no
emotion, sensation or consciousness: "She is oblivious to her sur-
roundings and will remain so. Her body twitches only reflexively,
without consciousness. The areas of her brain that once thought,
felt, and experienced sensations have degenerated badly and are
continuing to do so."'79 As the petitioners and dissenting Justices
noted, a person in such a diminished state has no interest in con-
tinued treatment, no matter how benign, because she has no inter-
est in life.8' Indeed, they base their claim for nontreatment on the
fact that Nancy Cruzan's life had effectively ended. Nontreatment
leading to total brain death would not deprive her of anything of
71 See infra Part I(A).
See infra Part IV(C).
" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2879, 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He made no claim that treatment
was causing her pain. If pain were shown, see supra note 22, then a strong argument would
exist for discontinuing treatment because continuing treatment would impair her interests.
so Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863, 2867-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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value to her because she had already lost the experiences and ca-
pacities that make life a good for persons. Her personal life was
already over, though she was not yet dead under prevailing defini-
tions of brain death, a position consistent with court decisions de-
nying a comatose person damages for loss of enjoyment of the ac-
tivities of life which her comatose state now prevents her from
experiencing.81
If she had no interest in further living, however, it does not nec-
essarily follow that she also had an interest in dying. If allowing
her to die cannot harm her because she no longer has interests in
any meaningful sense, then she cannot be harmed by further main-
tenance either. Nancy Cruzan simply had no further interests in
being treated or not being treated. In the absence of interests,
treatment cannot violate any interest or harm her in her perma-
nently comatose state. Moreover, even if treatment might, in some
circumstances, harm incompetent patients, it cannot harm the irre-
versibly comatose because they lack interests altogether.
How valid are the concerns about the indignity and humiliation
which result from being sustained artificially which animate the
dissenting opinions of Justices Brennan and Stevens? Justice
Brennan wrote eloquently about the desire for a "quiet, proud
death, bodily integrity intact" and the avoidance of an "ignoble
end, steeped in decay" with submission of the most private bodily
functions to the attention of others, resulting in the "debilitating
effects of a long drawn out death on family members." '82 Justice
Stevens was especially concerned about the patient's interest in
"how she will be thought of after her death by those whose opin-
ions mattered to her." 3
For patients who are contemplating future situations of depen-
dency or who are dependent and aware of their plight, these are
real concerns which deserve respect. They are also real concerns
for persons afraid that they or friends or family will become as
dependent and debilitated as Nancy Cruzan. These concerns, how-
8' Brain death requires total cessation of all brain function, including brain stem func-
tions which continue when a person is in a persistent vegetative state. See infra notes 201.
02 and accompanying text. For decisions denying recovery of damages for loss of enjoyment
by comatose persons, see McDougal v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d
937 (1989); Nussbaum v. Gibstein, 73 N.Y.2d 912, 536 N.E.2d 618, 539 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1989).
82 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2868-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2885-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ever, cannot matter to the comatose patient, who lacks awareness
of her situation and its impact on her family.84 None of Justice
Brennan's and Justice Stevens' concerns could have mattered to
Nancy Cruzan after she had irretrievably lost awareness. Thus, be-
cause the patient was not capable of feeling the indignity or humil-
iation which may result from artificial treatment, these concerns
do not show that gastrostomy feeding harmed Nancy Cruzan.
3. Incompetent Patients Must Be Treated Equally. The peti-
tioners' claim in Cruzan that treatment violated Nancy Cruzan's
right to decide against treatment also takes a form that combines
aspects of the two claims just considered. They claim-and the
dissent and many state supreme courts agree-that equal treat-
ment of incompetents requires that they have the same right to
refuse treatment that the competent patient has.8 5 Otherwise in-
competent patients would be treated unequally solely because of
their incompetency. Accordingly, equal respect for incompetent pa-
tients requires that they have a right to have a proxy refuse treat-
ment on their behalf.
Resolution of this issue is key to many ethical and policy ques-
tions concerning incompetent patients. It is a key point of differ-
ence between the majority and three dissenting justices in
Cruzan.8 e If incompetent patients have a right to be treated as if
they are competent decisionmakers and a corresponding right to
have surrogates infer their choices, then states will be much more
limited in the choices that they can make for incompetent
patients.
Proponents of this view, however, make a conceptual error. It is
true that incompetent persons may have a constitutional right to
be treated with respect; they do not lose all rights just because
they are incompetent. It does not follow, however, that they have
84 The distinction between how others view an incompetent patient and to what extent, if
any, that patient may herself be experiencing the situation of illness and dependency is a
crucial one that is often overlooked in discussions of these issues. Obviously if the patient
were aware of her condition, one could make a strong argument in favor of withholding
treatment to prevent her suffering.
85 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13, at 236.
86 The majority held that clear and convincing evidence of a patient's own expressed in-
tent to withhold life-sustaining treatment will suffice. Cruzan, 110 S. CL at 2849. In con-
trast, the dissenters argued that a state must either repose the choice with the person whom
the patient would have chosen as proxy or leave the decision to the patient's family. Id. at
2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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exactly the same rights as competent patients because the exis-
tence of certain rights necessarily depends upon a minimal level of
mental functioning.
The majority recognizes this point when it points out that the
claim of equality begs the question: "an incompetent person is not
able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypo-
thetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right'
must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate. '87 An
incompetent person cannot herself exercise the right to refuse
treatment because the exercise of this right requires the mental
capacity to be aware of the situation, to understand the alterna-
tives and to make a choice. Thus, it is not meaningful to speak of
an incompetent patient's possession of the same right to refuse
treatment that a competent person possesses.
The majority's point is correct. Clearly, incompetent persons do
not lose all constitutional protection merely because they are in-
competent."8 They do not, however, retain the same constitutional
rights that competent persons enjoy. Certain rights necessarily re-
quire a minimum degree of mental functioning, while others may
exist at lower functional levels. For example, a severely retarded
person may lack the ability to vote, though she retains an interest
in life. Thus her right to vote cannot be violated, but her right to
life could be. 9 Similarly, the right to consent to or refuse medical
care is also dependent on some minimum degree of mental func-
tioning. Unless a person has the capacity to recognize alternatives
and make choices, a claim that she has the right to refuse treat-
ment makes no sense.
Indeed, Justice Brennan inadvertently supported the very claim
87 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
Although Justice Stevens mistakenly identified what the interests of a permanently
comatose patient are, he correctly noted that "Our Constitution presupposes a respect for
the personhood of every individual ... " 110 S. Ct. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting), thereby
denying the claim "that chronically incompetent persons have no constitutionally cognizable
interests at all, and so are not persons within the meaning of the Constitution." Id. at 2891.
88 The same point could be made about the right to read or to reproduce. If the minimum
mental ability to exercise these rights is missing, then it is nonsense to speak of that person
as having such rights. See Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim That
Others Can Exercise an Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JuRIMa'racs J. 389, 395.96
(1989). The great difficulties that some persons-even lawyers-have with this point is evi.
dent in the responses to Ellman by Alan Meisel and Lois Snyder, Letters, 20 HASTINGS




that he attempted to refute. He noted: "The right to be free of
unwanted medical attention is a right to evaluate the potential
benefit of treatment and its possible consequences according to
one's own values and to make a personal decision whether to sub-
ject oneself to intrusion."'90 Such a right cannot be held by some-
one who utterly lacks the capacity to distinguish between benefits
and burdens and express preferences. Such a person cannot have a
right to refuse treatment because the notion of choice is irrelevant
to her in her present condition, just as the idea that she has a right
to vote for President is irrelevant.
Justice Brennan's assertion that "the fact that Nancy Cruzan is
now incompetent [does not] deprive her of her fundamental
rights" is not apposite because he fails to distinguish between the
fundamental rights that one loses by incompetency and those that
one retains.91 Incompetent persons may retain fundamental rights
of life and liberty to the extent that these concepts have meaning
for them, but it does not follow that they also have fundamental
rights to speak, vote, read or make medical decisions when they
lack the capacity or awareness essential to the exercise of those
rights.
Equal treatment of incompetent patients requires that their in-
terests, to the extent that they exist, be respected. With regard to
medical treatment, those interests may require either that treat-
ment be provided or that it be withheld, depending on the benefits
and burdens of a proposed treatment.9 2 In some cases, the incom-
petent patient will have a strong interest in receiving medical
treatment to make continued living possible. In other cases, the
treatment may be so burdensome and the resulting life may be so
marginal, that the patient's interests are best served by withhold-
ing treatment.93 When the patient is irreversibly comatose, how-
ever, neither treatment nor its absence serves her interests because
90 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2867-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2867. Of course a comatose patient may lose all rights because she no longer has
any interests which could be protected by the recognition of any rights. For a discussion of
whether the state could classify comatose patients as dead, see infra Part V(B)(3).
92 See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)
(upholding probate judge's determination that, in a case involving a 68-year-old severely
retarded leukemia patient, the "negative factors of treatment exceeded the benefits" and
that therefore treatment could be withheld).
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the patient lacks the mental capacity to have any interests
whatsoever. 
4
If this claim is precisely understood, it is not inaccurate to say
that incompetent patients have a "right" to have a surrogate or
proxy decide for them. If they cannot make decisions for them-
selves, then someone else will have to make decisions for them.
Traditionally, a guardian has been appointed to make decisions for
incompetent persons, but the appointment of a guardian is not
necessary if the incompetent patient's interests are otherwise pro-
tected. Moreover, the guardian or surrogate has no duty to deter-
mine what the person had or would have chosen when competent.
Rather, respect for the incompetent patient merely requires that
her current interests and welfare be respected, not that previously
held interests, which no longer apply to her incompetent situation,
be protected.
The incompetent patient thus does not have a right to have a
surrogate decide for her according to what she previously wanted
or according to the surrogate's substituted judgment concerning
what the incompetent patient would have chosen if she were com-
petent. States may be free to adopt such an approach, but it is not
constitutionally required to protect the incompetent patient's in-
terests."5 If she does have present interests, for example if she is
not comatose, those interests could be protected directly or by a
surrogate decision designed to protect her current interests.
4. No Prior Directive Against Treatment. Treatment of Nancy
Cruzan did not violate a right to have competently made advance
directives against treatment enforced after she became incompe-
tent.96 If such a right exists, it is a right to direct that treatment
' It does not follow that they have a right to die or that there is an obligation not to treat
them. If they lack interests in being alive, similarly, they have no interest in dying. Justice
Brennan thus contradicts himself (as do the Cruzans) on this point. If withholding treat.
ment from Nancy Cruzan does not harm her because she has only metabolic function, then
treating her over her family's wishes cannot harm her either. Furthermore, other actions
done to her without her or her family's consent, such as using her as an organ source or as a
subject of medical experimentation, would not harm her. If these actions are "too brave a
new world" for Justice Brennan and "for our Constitution," it must be because of their
impact on others and not because of demonstrable harm to the comatose person's interests.
110 S. Ct. at 2869 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" See supra Part III(A)(3) for a discussion of the patient's interests and how they are to
be protected.
90 For a discussion of whether there is such a right, see infra Part IV(B)(2).
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not occur at a future time when the person is incompetent. Such a
right would protect the interest of competent persons in directing
their future and in gaining assurance that certain undesirable out-
comes will not occur.
These interests exist only if the patient in fact contemplated the
future situation and chose a particular outcome, for example issu-
ing a directive that certain interventions not occur. Thus, a state
requirement for treatment of an incompetent patient would violate
a right to refuse treatment by advance directive only if the person,
when competent, had in fact directed that treatment not occur. In-
ferences or guesses that the patient would have issued such a di-
rective if she had thought of it are not equivalent to making a
directive.
In Cruzan there was no claim that, when Nancy Cruzan was
competent, she had issued a written directive against treatment if
she became incompetent. Whether she issued an oral directive was
in dispute.9 7 If she had not issued an explicit written or oral direc-
tive against treatment, however, the state did not violate a right to
make such directives when it required that she be treated.
5. Clear and Convincing Evidence Test for Prior Directives. The
petitioners claimed that the state ignored evidence that Nancy
Cruzan issued oral directives against being medically sustained in a
comatose state. Although she did not formally sign a living will or
orally specify that no gastrostomy feeding should occur, they
claimed that she made statements to friends and family that con-
stitute an advance directive against treatment.98 The state found
the evidence of a prior directive insufficient because the family did
not meet the clear and convincing standard of proof for establish-
ing such directives. The question for the Court was whether this
standard violated a person's right to refuse medical care by ad-
vance directive.
The majority's conclusion that the state may legitimately require
a high degree of certainty that a prior directive against treatment
has been made is neither irrational nor unjustifiably obstructive of
This was a major evidentiary point of difference, upon which the case turned.
See Comatose Woman's Lawyer Seeks to Reopen Death Issue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
1990, § 1, at 8, col. 3. The article reported that the family has "new evidence that she would
not want to continue living in her condition." The family's petition stated that "three wit-
nesses had come forward to tell of 'specific discussions with Nancy Cruzan regarding her
wishes about life-sustaining medical treatment."' Id.
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such choices. If there is a right to refuse medical care in advance,
state requirements to ensure that the right has in fact been exer-
cised serve legitimate state interests in protecting life and in
preventing erroneous determinations about what the patient had
chosen when she was competent.
If a directive is binding and thus determines whether the incom-
petent patient will live or die, it is not unreasonable or unduly bur-
densome to require that the directive be knowingly and clearly ex-
pressed. The clear and convincing standard of proof ensures that
the choice was in fact made and protects against termination of
treatment when the patient had not in fact so directed.
If the right to make a binding advance directive is based on the
importance to a person of knowing that she is directing the future
and thus avoiding certain situations, then requiring that she con-
sider that situation specifically and issue her directive in some ex-
plicit manner would seem to be consistent with that right. Al-
though some procedural hurdles might violate the right to make
such directives, requiring a clear showing that the person exercised
prior choice is reasonable.
The state's interests in protecting life and preventing erroneous
determinations are legitimate and important. The real import of
an advance directive arises when treatment would actually serve
the incompetent patient's interests, yet the directive is against
treatment."9 Honoring the directive would deprive the incompetent
patient of treatment that would serve her present interest. If au-
tonomous competent choices are to be privileged over the incompe-
tent person's current interests, it is reasonable to require a clear
showing that the competent person did indeed freely and know-
ingly issue a directive that trumps the incompetent patient's cur-
rent interests. Thus, contrary to Justice Brennan's claims,100 the
" This conflict is seldom noted. Most people think that the directive is a way to have
treatment withheld when treatment would not be deemed to be in the patient's interests
and there is no other way to establish that point.
,o Justice Brennan's argument goes as follows: The biased nature of the Missouri rule is
most evident in "its categorical exclusion of relevant evidence" of Nancy's wishes. Cruzan,
110 S. Ct. at 2871-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finding that her statements to family and
friends were unreliable indicators of what she would want, the Missouri court seemed to
suggest that "only a living will or equivalently formal directive from the patient when com-
petent would meet this standard." Id. at 2875. Since few people actually issue such direc-
tives or think about the matter beforehand, requiring such specific evidence of the compe-
tent person's wishes ignores much relevant evidence of "what the patient's choice would be"
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clear and convincing standard does not bias or skew the decision
toward life; it merely ensures that a decision in favor of death is
not inappropriately reached.
A requirement that the existence of a prior directive be clearly
shown does not prevent persons from making such directives and
legitimately protects incompetent patients. Because the interest in
making enforceable prior directives is based on the importance to
the individual of exercising autonomy and gaining certainty about
future outcomes, requiring that the person clearly exercise choice
to that end is legitimate. A presumed or inferred exercise of auton-
omy, or an unthinking or casual exercise, does not involve the exer-
cise of autonomy that is so central to persons that it can override
their later interests. In addition, it shifts control to the evidence
about the prior choice proffered by persons who may have their
own competing interests in a given outcome.
Critics of this position point to the burdens or obstacles that
such requirements place in the way of persons seeking to issue
prior directives against treatment.10 These critics argue that peo-
ple are not able to exercise their right of advance choice because
they may not have known about the specific requirements neces-
sary to that exercise. Furthermore, they argue, this requirement
discriminates against the young, the poor and minorities who do
not have access to legal advice and the means to make such
directives.
This criticism is unpersuasive. If the right concerns the consid-
ered exercise of autonomy, then one simply must exercise it in a
considered way. It is not unreasonable to require that the exercise
in fact occur and that it be documented in writing or be made ex-
and "evinces a disdain for her own right to choose." Id. The Missouri rule thus "skevs the
result away from a determination that as accurately as possible reflects the individuals' own
preferences and beliefs." Id. at 2876. It is a rule that transforms human beings into passive
subjects of medical technology." Id.
Although he finds the Missouri rule invalid, Justice Brennan would recognize safeguards
that are "genuinely aimed at ensuring decisions commensurate with the will of the patient
and... [which are] reliable as instruments to that end," such as mandatory judicial review
of family or surrogate decisions. Id. The states have much leeway here, as long as the state
"is seeking in a reliable manner to discover what he patient would want," without skewing
the decision in some way. Id.
101 A Limited Right to Die, TIm, July 9, 1990, at 59. Of course, such persons should not
always be treated when they have not clearly issued a prior directive. For example, if treat-
ment and further existence does not serve their current interests, treatment should be with-
held regardless of an explicit prior directive. See infra Part IV(c).
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plicit in some other manner to provide proof that it was exercised,
just as written contracts are required for certain other autonomous
decisions. A less restrictive position might lead to erroneous deter-
minations and premature death of incompetent patients who pos-
sess interests in treatment.10
2
6. Do What the Incompetent Patient Would Have Chosen If
Competent. A crucial difference between the majority and the dis-
sents in Cruzan concerns decisionmaking when the patient has not
clearly made a prior directive against treatment, that is, when
proof of the directive does not meet the clear and convincing stan-
dard. In this situation, Justice Brennan and other critics of the de-
cision argue that the incompetent patient has a right to have a
proxy make a treatment decision consistent with the decision the
patient herself, if competent, would have chosen.10 3 In effect, crit-
ics claim that an incompetent patient has a right to loose substi-
tuted judgment-to have a proxy decide the matter according to
how the proxy thinks that the person would have decided at a pre-
vious time when she was competent.
This contention raises another major public policy issue regard-
ing incompetent patients. If a patient has not previously issued a
clear directive against treatment, should the patient be treated
solely in terms of her present interests, or should treatment deci-
sions attempt to approximate what the patient would have chosen
if she were competent and endowed with her previous interests and
values?
As an ethical matter, arguments for each position can be as-
serted. Those who support treating the patient as she was speak of
the trajectory of a life and emphasize that the incompetent pa-
tient's long prior history should not be ignored. 10 4 The opposing
view emphasizes that respect for the incompetent patient requires
that she be regarded as she now is and not as she previously was.100
102 The state could also require that an informed choice is be made because the very
nature of the interest being protected is autonomy. Perhaps the state could also require that
persons making such directives are aware of certain important features of the choice, such
as the fact that future interests may be very different or that decisions might be made on
some other acceptable basis.
103 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2875-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375 (1988).




State courts have varied on the issue. For example, Massachusetts
has adopted a very loose substituted judgment approach, allowing
the family to determine treatment according to their view of what
the patient would have chosen if she were competent.10 New York
and New Jersey, on the other hand, appear to require treatment. 107
As a constitutional matter, however, it is difficult to see how the
result urged by the dissent follows. The incompetent patient has a
right to have her interests and present welfare respected to the ex-
tent that she has interests.0" Her present welfare is served by
treating her in terms of her current interests, not in terms of inter-
ests that she previously had but which are no longer relevant. In-
deed, treating her in terms of her previous interests could hurt her
because it could lead to nontreatment when her current interests
would be served by treatment. In addition, allowing the proxy to
determine what the patient would have chosen if she were compe-
tent-an ambiguous standard open to several competing mean-
ings-risks having the proxy choose what competent persons gen-
erally would choose or what the proxy would want for herself.100
Evidence of what the patient would have chosen is often lacking. If
it does exist, it may show no awareness of the fact that a person's
interests may change significantly once she becomes
incompetent. 10
If the concern is the welfare and interests of the incompetent
patient, that welfare is not served by treating the patient in terms
of what she would want if she were still competent and endowed
with her prior interests and values. To treat the incompetent pa-
tient according to her past values is to ignore the welfare of the
incompetent patient as she now is. Thus, the loose substituted
10 See Guardianship of Linda, 401 Mass. 783, 519 N.E.2d 1296 (1988) (enumerating six
inquiries relevant to the court-adopted substituted judgment test).
107 See In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987) (holding that there must be clear
and convincing evidence that incompetent patient would have refused treatment before
guardian may force hospital to discontinue treatment); In re Westchester County Medical
Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 531 N.E.2d 607 (1988) (holding that there must be
clear and convincing evidence of a prior directive against treatment before patient's daugh-
ters could require hospital to discontinue treatment).
108 See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
109 The perils of substituted judgment are discussed in Dresser & Robertson, supra note
13, at 242-43.
110 There could also be cases where it is in the interest of the patient not to be treated,
but the loose substituted judgment doctrine allows an extremely vitalist family to have the
patient treated against her wishes.
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judgment test cannot be constitutionally required because it does
not protect the interests of the incompetent patient."'
Nor can adopting this test be constitutionally required due to a
right of competent persons to be treated as they would have cho-
sen to be treated when they were competent if they ever become
incompetent. If competent persons have a constitutional right to
make enforceable directives against future medical care, that right
is grounded in the importance to them of making such a directive.
That importance, however, exists only if the competent person
contemplates the situation and actually chooses to forgo future
treatment. If the competent person has not made such a choice,
there is no interest in any particular exercise of autonomy. Being
treated as one might have chosen, when one has not made a choice,
cannot be required out of respect for the competent person's
autonomy.
Thus, the basis for such a right is very weak: people will be reas-
sured knowing that in the future they will be treated in accordance
with their past values and interests despite the fact that their fu-
ture situation is very different than their past situation and that
they have not issued an explicit directive about future treatment.
It is equally plausible that people will be reassured knowing that
they will be treated in accordance with their interests in their fu-
ture situations rather than in accordance with what they, when
competent, might have predicted their interests to be if they be-
came incompetent. A constitutional right of incompetent patients
who have not issued prior directives to be treated according to
what a proxy thinks they might have chosen when they were com-
petent cannot rest on such a weak rationale.
A corollary of the majority's position is that an incompetent pa-
tient has no right to have a particular proxy decide for her or to
have a proxy decide according to what the patient would have cho-
sen if she were competent. The incompetent person has a right to
be treated with respect-that is to say, to have her current inter-
ests protected-but a particular proxy is not necessary to protect
the incompetent patient's interests as long as those interests are
otherwise being protected. Similarly, a proxy who is best situated
"I Whether the substituted judgment test is constitutionally permissible despite the fact
that it might override the interests of incompetent patients, is discussed infra text accompa-
nying notes 185-86.
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to determine what the incompetent patient would have chosen if
she were competent is not required to protect those interests. The
incompetent patient merely has a right to have her interests pro-
tected as she is now, not as she was previously.
112
B. The Family's Right to Determine Treatment for Incompetent
Patients
The Cruzans argued that they had an independent right to de-
cide about Nancy's treatment as part of a fundamental right of
family autonomy or privacy in intimate family matters. The major-
ity rejected this claim without extensive discussion.11
As a constitutional matter, the Court was correct to reject this
claim. The right to make decisions about intimate matters, such as
whether to have children and how to rear them, are constitution-
ally protected aspects of family autonomy.114 Cases involving hand-
icapped newborns, however, demonstrate that family privacy has
never included a right to withhold necessary medical care or to de-
cide which medical care is necessary." 5 Moreover, although state
grants of family discretion over a child's mental healthcare have
been upheld, those cases did not turn on whether the parents had
the right to make such choices.11 6 Medical decisions pose the risk
1'2 Whether there is a right to appoint a proxy who will have binding authority to decide
for the incompetent patient is discussed infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
'1 The family's claim has been articulated most succinctly by Professor Peggy Davis in a
letter to the New York Times:
The Court's opinion gave virtually no acknowledgment of the traditionally rec-
ognized right of healthy families to maintain a realm of decision-making with
respect to intensely personal moral issues .... [L]egislatively determined ide-
ology may well trump the judgments we would have made and the judgments
of those bound to us by blood, trust and affection, leaving us in irreversible
states that are less than conscious life. This is helplessness in a sense that is
both profound and profoundly at war with the faith in individual dignity and
private choice that animates our system of ordered liberty.
Right-to-Die Ruling Curtails Individual Liberty, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1990, § A, at 20, col.
4. The Court rejected this claim. It distinguished cases that had upheld family autonomy
over the medical treatment of children by noting that it had involved a challenge of a state
grant of discretion to the family and thus did not hold that such discretion was constitution-
ally required. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
114 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"5 See generally, Robertson, The Rights of Critically Ill Children, in THE RIGHrrs OF THE
CRITICALLY ILL 80-97 (1983).
"' Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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of conflicting family interests. As the majority noted in Cruzan:
"Close family members may have a strong feeling.., that they do
not wish to witness the continuation of the life of a loved one
which they regard as hopeless, meaningless and even degrading."111
Should the sphere of family autonomy be expanded to include
such decisions? Many people think that parents of handicapped
newborns should have the right to make decisions regarding the
children's treatment, at least in cases where the children do not
reasonably appear to have interests in being treated and staying
alive. A similar argument may apply to treatment decisions for a
family member who is comatose or otherwise severely incompetent.
The family is closest to the incompetent patient, has been caring
for her and is deeply affected. It would seem to be within the
bounds of family life that the family have the authority to deter-
mine when treatment should end. On this view, the family's wishes
should be overriden only where they are inconsistent with the pa-
tient's current interest in being treated. 118
As a policy matter, this position is appealing as long as there are
sufficient safeguards to ensure that family desires do not unreason-
ably subordinate the interests of the patients. Whether such a pos-
ture is constitutionally required, however, is another matter. The
family may be very burdened emotionally, but psychological bur-
den alone is insufficient to give rise to a fundamental right.1 Nor
is there an established tradition of having family members make
such choices to ground a fundamental right, as there is with repro-
duction, education and choice of residence. Indeed, in most states,
family members have no right to make treatment decisions for in-
competent patients unless they have been appointed guardian. As
guardian, their duty is to protect the ward's best interests, not to
promote their own.
Establishing such a right to help the Cruzans would have ramifi-
cations-and dangers-in many other situations. Apart from any
questions regarding the definition of "family," would the scope of
117 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855-56.
18 This is in essence Rhoden's position, though it is based on the family's own interests,
not on the notion that it best serves the patient's interests. See Rhoden, supra note 104, at
379.
"1 For example, the family's psychological burden does not permit them to have treat-
ment withheld from an infant born prematurely as the result of an induced abortion or from
handicapped children. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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this liberty extend to nontreatment for children, adults and par-
ents?12 Would the family thus have a right to have treatment
withheld from elderly relatives in nursing homes as well as from
handicapped newborns? Families are well-meaning, but families
are also cruel. The risk that their decisions will serve the family's
own interest instead of the interests of the incompetent patient is
too great to be ignored. In addition, every state law concerning
guardianship or substituted judgment for incompetent persons
would be subject to constitutional attack as an interference with
family privacy.
The conclusion that the sphere of constitutionally protected
family autonomy does not extend this far is defensible because of
the unprecedented nature and potentially dangerous scope of such
a view of family autonomy. As a practical matter, the family is
claiming a right to cause the patient's death. Clearly, the state has
the power to determine when death occurs notwithstanding con-
trary views. Similarly, the state should have the ultimate power to
decide whether the incompetent patient has interests worthy of
protection. People may differ over whether there is a vitalist inter-
est here, but the state is not required to adopt the family's view as
to whether an incompetent person's life is worth protecting merely
because of the burden that the person's continued life may impose
on the family.121
120 Difficult questions would arise about the definition of "family": Is it biological or so-
cial? Is unanimity or a majority vote sufficient? Establishing a family's right to make proxy
decisions would require that these questions be answered as a matter of constitutional law.
121 Some critics of Cruzan, as well as Justice Stevens in his dissent, argue that the state
inappropriately deprived the family of control over the body of Nancy Cruzan. Cruzan, 110
S. Ct. at 2881-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since the state's requirement is based on vitalist
interests-interests in protecting and preserving human life for its own sake even when ben-
efit to the patient cannot be shown-the question of whether its vitalism is inappropriate
depends upon whether its policies impose on the protected interests of others. As we have
seen, because Nancy Cruzan was comatose, the requirement did not interfere with her inter-
ests or violate her rights.
Nor did it violate her family's right to determine whether she was dead or worth protect-
ing. The state, not the family, is the final arbiter of what constitutes death and protectible
life, that is unless the state is utterly irrational and arbitrary. The state is not required to
equate cognitive death with death, and the state may adopt a whole brain definition of
death despite the family's objections. See infra notes 201-03 and accompan)ing text.
Even when a patient is dead, it would not follow that the family has the right to dispose
of the body as they wish. Although the family has traditionally had the right to decide on
form of burial, as opposed to the doctor, hospital or funeral home, it does not follow that
they have a fundamental right against the state in this regard. Thus, the state may prevent
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE VITALISM TOWARD
NONCOMATOSE PATIENTS
Cruzan upheld a state policy of extreme vitalism because no
constitutional rights had been violated in the situation before the
Court. An important question after Cruzan is whether there are
constitutional limits to state vitalism in treatment situations that
do not involve comatose patients. In order to preserve human life,
may the state require that competent persons also be treated? May
it refuse to enforce a prior directive against treatment? May it re-
quire that all noncomatose, incompetent patients be maintained in
order to protect human life?
The clearest limits on state vitalism arise in cases where there
are competently made choices against treatment or where treat-
ment would clearly harm the incompetent patient. This section
discusses constitutional limits on state vitalism toward nonco-
matose patients.
A. The Competent Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
Although widespread support for honoring competent refusals of
medical care exists, state attempts to override such choices to pro-
tect human life will undoubtedly occur. Such conflicts could arise
when adults refuse medical care necessary to keep them alive, and
physicians or family seek judicial approval to treat them. Conflicts
could also arise when a competent patient wishes to commit sui-
cide, seeks the assistance of others in suicide or requests active
euthanasia.
Although these issues did not directly arise in Cruzan, both the
majority and the dissenters agreed that competent patients have
some constitutional right to refuse necessary medical treatment. 22
There are important differences, however, between the majority
and the dissenters regarding the nature and scope of such a right.
The majority noted that "the principle that a competent person
families from burying cadavers of loved ones on their property or from storing them in a
freezer. It may also require that autopsies be done and presumably could require that or-
gans and tissue be donated for transplant or research after death. For example, constitu.
tional attacks on laws allowing postmortem use of corneas without the family's consent have
not succeeded. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059
(1987); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 138 Mich. App. 683, 360 N.W.2d 275 (1984).





has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment" could be inferred from previous
cases.123 The majority, however, was careful not to discuss this "in-
terest" either as a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny or as
an interest "encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of
privacy. 1 24 In addition, the majority said nothing about the
method of "balancing . . . liberty interests against the relevant
state interests" in cases involving refusals of medical care. 2 '
Justice O'Connor described the "liberty interest" in forced medi-
cal treatment more fully than the majority and noted that un-
wanted nutrition and hydration would implicate that interest. Im-
position of medical treatment on an unwilling, competent adult
"necessarily involves some form of restraint and intrusion." 120 She
noted that "a seriously ill or dying patient whose wishes are not
honored may feel a captive of the machinery required for life-sus-
taining measures or other medical interventions. 1 27 Accordingly,
the "liberty guaranteed by the Due Process clause must protect, if
it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to re-
ject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water."12 8 Her apparently firm commitment to this liberty interest
included no clues about the standard of scrutiny that she would
apply to conflicts between the state and this liberty interest.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, noted the majority's avoid-
ance of "discussing either the measure of that liberty interest or its
application" and explicitly stated that the liberty interest under
discussion is a "fundamental right" deeply rooted in American law
and jurisprudence.' 29 The tradition of informed consent in tort law
is evidence that the "inviolability of the person is "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental."' 30 Accordingly, the state would have to show compelling
123 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
124 Id. at 2851 n.7.
125 Id. at 2852.
126 Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127 Id. Does her comment about the interest of a seriously ill or dying patient indicate
that she would not find a "liberty interest" with a less seriously ill patient, who might also
feel that he is "a captive of machinery"? Id.
2 Id. at 2857.
129 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2865. Justice Stevens characterizes the right as one of privacy founded on the
important interest in bodily integrity and human dignity. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2884-85
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reasons for interfering with refusals of treatment.131
Although they are not significant in Cruzan itself, these differ-
ences in the articulation of the right of a competent person to re-
fuse medical treatment may be significant in other situations. The
majority's use of the term "liberty interest" rather than "right" is
a significant move in the Court's ongoing debate about the deriva-
tion of unwritten rights from the open-textured clauses of the Con-
stitution. By calling it a fourteenth amendment "liberty interest"
rather than a privacy right, the majority avoids acknowledging the
existence of fundamental, unenumerated rights of privacy. Justice
Brennan, on the other hand, sees this right as consistent with the
Court's tradition of enumerating substantive rights under the due
process clause.
This move, however, is not merely symbolic; it could substan-
tially affect the standard of scrutiny that state restrictions on
treatment refusals must meet. By avoiding "fundamental right"
language, the Court may implicitly allow states to restrict this "lib-
erty interest" upon a lesser showing of need than it would require
if that interest were characterized as a fundamental right, thereby
requiring the state to meet the rigorous standard of scrutiny tradi-
tionally applied to violations of fundamental rights.1 32
Given the majority's terminology, the extent to which states may
interfere with competent refusals of medical care remains undeter-
mined. A standard of scrutiny less strict than compelling state in-
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
... The state action limiting it "cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently
important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Cruzan,
110 S. Ct. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 For example, calling termination of pregnancy a "liberty interest" in Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989), indicated that the interest at stake
was less firmly protected than a fundamental right because any reasonable state interest, or
at least one which does not impose an "undue burden," would justify state interference with
that liberty. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that deprivation of
disability benefits, a liberty or property interest, without an evidentiary hearing did not
violate due process).
As in the abortion case, Justice O'Connor may again be the "swing vote." Her apparent
commitment to this "liberty interest" will be tested by what she counts as "undue burdens"
on its exercise. If she would require a complainant to demonstrate an "undue burden," as it
appears to be in abortion, Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring), then the
state will have greater room to override patient choice than if a compelling interest standard
were imposed. If this were the case, she would be less protective of this right than her
rhetoric in Cruzan suggests.
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terest, such as no undue burden or significant state interest, might
permit a state to override a competent patient's refusal of medical
treatment when the treatment is minimally intrusive or would re-
store the patient to a functional existence, as in cases involving
blood transfusions for patients who are religiously opposed to them
or other cases involving potential cures.1 33 If preservation of life is
a legitimate interest and intervention will restore the person to a
reasonably functional life, then medical treatment might be viewed
as not impqsing an "undue burden" on the competent patient. If
this interpretation is correct, the state will have the power in many
situations to preserve life over the wishes of competent patients."
The standard of scrutiny will also be crucial in determining
whether the fourteenth amendment liberty interest protects indi-
vidual autonomy in situations beyond refusal of medical treatment,
such as suicide, assisted suicide and active euthanasia.
A strong case can be made for extending the liberty interest rec-
ognized in Cruzan to suicide by passive means-a refusal to eat or
to accept medical care generally or after a suicide attempt. If the
interest in bodily integrity permits one to refuse medical care when
one is ill, it should also permit one to refuse food or treatment in
other circumstances, such as suicide by starvation or the refusal of
medical care after a failed suicide attempt, if competency can be
established.
Indeed, Justice Scalia's argument against recognizing a right to
refuse medical care is based on his perception that suicide by re-
fusal of food or treatment cannot be distinguished from other re-
fusals of necessary medical care.1" 5 Because suicide even by passive
means has not been considered a fundamental right, there should
be no right to cause one's death by refusal of medical treatment.136
1" See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
"' Even if the right here were recognized as a fundamental right, there may be some
situations in which the patient's refusal might be overridden, such as cases where the intru-
sion is miihnal and the patient will be restored to a normal, healthy life.
"' Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2860-62 (Scalia, J., concurring). Recall Chief Justice Rehnquist's
response to this point- "We do not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of
an informed and voluntary decision by an adult to starve to death." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at
2852.
138 Id. at 2860-61 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, however, overlooked the possibil-
ity that the person's interests in living are different in each case.
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As he noted, attempts to distinguish Nancy Cruzan's case from the
ordinary suicide do not work. Permanent incapacitation or pain
would not justify or require that a person be allowed to commit
suicide.13 7 Nor does an active versus passive distinction properly
distinguish the cases because starving oneself to death is as inten-
tional a killing of oneself as using a gun.138 If the state may inter-
fere with the active killing of oneself, it should also be able to in-
terfere with passively causing death.13 9 Moreover, the interference
with attempted suicide may involve as much of an intrusion on
bodily integrity as overriding a competent refusal of medical treat-
ment. If a state may use force to prevent a person from slashing
his wrists, to administer a blood transfusion after a suicide attempt
or to pump an overdose of barbiturites from his stomach, it should
also be able to prevent him from killing himself by refusing neces-
sary medical care.140
If the Court applied the logic of personal autonomy and found
that the fourteenth amendment's liberty interest includes a right
to kill oneself by active or passive means in nonmedical situations,
the Court's standard for interfering with that liberty interest might
reinstate prohibitions on suicide. That is, if only a rational basis or
undue burden for interferences with that right must be shown,
then the state's interest in preventing mistakes and protecting life
might easily satisfy a standard of scrutiny less than a compelling
state interest standard.
The same problem arises with a competent person's claim of a
constitutional right to active suicide, assisted suicide or consensual
active euthanasia in situations of terminal or chronic illness. One
can make a cogent argument that the logic of a right to refuse nec-
essary medical care necessarily entails these extensions. For exam-
ple, if the competent patient has a right to cause her death pas-
137 Id. at 2860.
138 Id. at 2861.
," Id. at 2862.
04 Justice Scalia noted:
To raise up a constitutional right here we would have to create out of nothing
(for it exists neither in text nor tradition) some constitutional principle
whereby, although the state may insist that an individual come in out of the
cold and eat food, it may not insist that he take medicine; and although it may
pump his stomach empty of poison he has ingested, it may not fill his stomach




sively by refusing medical care, then her right to kill herself by
active means should logically follow as should her right to have the
assistance of others in pursuing that end. State prohibitions on sui-
cide or assisted suicide may be viewed as imposing bodily bur-
dens-by preventing their removal-just as forcing unwanted
treatment on a competent patient imposes bodily burdens. Suicide
enables the patient to avoid the bodily burdens of severe illness
and a life no longer worth living, just as the refusals of medical
care do. This logic would also make consensual active euthanasia a
constitutional right of a competent patient unable to cause her
own death.141
Even if active steps to cause one's death were found to be pro-
tected as a liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment, the
weak standard of scrutiny would remain an obstacle to the asser-
tion of such a right by competent patients. State restrictions on
assisted suicide or active euthanasia to prevent mistakes, to pre-
serve life and to protect the role of physicians might easily satisfy
a less strict standard of scrutiny.142
B. May the State Refuse to Enforce Advance Directives Against
Medical Treatment?
A state's vitalist policies might also come into conflict with di-
rectives made by competent persons against treatment if they be-
come incompetent. For example, a state may refuse to honor living
wills altogether, in cases of nonterminal conditions or in cases in-
volving the withdrawal of artificial food and water. It may do so
because it wishes to preserve human life whenever possible, be-
' If one sees the underlying right as encompassing the dignity to decide when one dies
or the dignity in not being bound to a state of burdensome life as judged by the person
herself, then the right should extend to having the assistance of others, either to provide the
mean or to perform the act when she has no other means of accomplishing it. The right in
question would be the right to be free of state interference-prohibition or subsequent pun-
ishment-in a person's efforts to rid herself of a life that she finds burdensome. Although
courts will not easily recognize such rights, the pressure to do so will increase as more physi-
cians assist patients to commit suicide and state laws pose barriers to the practice. See, e.g.,
Altman, Doctor Says He Agonized but Gave Drug for Suicide, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1991, at
1.
142 A primary objection to consensual, active euthanasia is the assumption that physicians
will necessarily be the agents who cause death, as is the practice in the Netherlands. See
Singer & Siegler, Euthanasia-A Critique, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 1881, 1883 (1990). However,
active euthanasia practices need not depend upon physician involvment.
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cause it thinks that the incompetent patient's interests deserve
protection or because it doubts whether such directives are know-
ingly made.
This possibility is not merely theoretical. Although living wills
are widely supported, explicit legal recognition is variable and usu-
ally substantively limited in some respect. 143 For example, many
states specifically authorize advance directives only for narrowly
defined "terminal conditions. 1 1 44 Some states do not recognize di-
rectives if the incompetent patient is pregnant or if artificial food
and water is at issue.145 Only thirteen states explicitly recognize a
person's right to appoint a healthcare proxy, leaving unclear the
effect of durable power of attorney in many circumstances. 140
May the state refuse to honor directives that fall outside specific
statutory authority? Or does the competent patient's liberty inter-
est in refusing medical care include a right to refuse treatment in
advance through written or oral directives or through the appoint-
ment of a health care proxy? The answer to these questions will
affect the power of the state to adopt vitalist policies when compe-
tent persons decide otherwise.
The constitutional status of prior directives against treatment
was not directly addressed in Cruzan. Nevertheless, statements in
several opinions suggest that a majority of the Court would find
some fourteenth amendment protection for advance refusals of
medical care.1 47 This section analyzes the arguments for and
against constitutional recognition of prior directives against medi-
cal care.
1. The Argument for Constitutional Recognition. The argument
for constitutional recognition of competently made, prior directives
"I See generally Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WXs. L. REv. 737.
.. Id. at 740-47.
" Id. at 750-53 (discussing statutes under which food, water, comfort-care and pain-re.
duction techniques cannot be withdrawn),.778-80 (discussing the effect of pregnancy on the
effectiveness of a living will in states which have considered this issue).
146 Justice O'Connor lists these statutes in her concurring opinion, Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at
2857-58 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For her listing of general durable power of attorney
statues and living will statutes that allow the appointment of a health care proxy, see id. at
2858 nn.3-4.
" If Justice O'Connor's statement that the Court's decision "does not preclude a future
determination that the Constitution requires the states to implement the decisions of a pa.
tient's duly appointed surrogate," id. at 2858, indicates her support of such a decision, then
her opinion combined with the four dissenting justices totals five votes in favor of the right
to make advance decisions regarding medical care.
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is based on personal autonomy and the importance to individuals
of directing their future. If a competent person is free to reject
medical treatment now, she should also be free to reject it in the
future. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion, such
recognition "may well be constitutionally required to protect the
patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment."14 8 Both
present and future refusals involve the exercise of autonomy. Ad-
vance directives also provide certainty that treatment scenarios
that burden family members and keep the patient alive in an un-
dignified and humiliating state will not occur.1 49
In this view, competently made prior directives should receive
the same constitutional protection that current refusals of medical
treatment receive. Presumably this respect would extend to writ-
ten or oral directives as well as to the decisions of an agent desig-
nated for healthcare decisions. State refusals to honor directives
would then have to meet the same standard of justification that
state attempts to override current refusals of medical treatment
must meet. If a competent patient may refuse treatment for
nonterminal conditions, food and water and treatment during
pregnancy, she would then also have the right to make advance,
enforceable directives against treatment if she is incompetent in
those situations.150
Competently made prior directives would thus be an important
check on state vitalism because they give control to the competent
patient who is concerned about treatment in future situations of
incompetency. States may set reasonable standards for establishing
148 Id. at 2857. She emphasizes that this question remains unresolved, suggesting that it
might be recognized in a case directly raising the issue. Because few persons in fact make
explicit oral or written directives concerning medical treatment when they become incompe-
tent, she also appeared inclined to recognize the choices of a proxy appointed by the pa-
tient. Thus the Court's decision in Cruzan "does not preclude a future determination that
the Constitution requires the States to implement the decisions of a patient's duly ap-
pointed surrogate." Id. at 2858. But if a surrogate may be appointed, a written or oral direc-
tive should also be constitutionally protected as well, even though she does not mention that
right.
149 It is also widely thought that an advance directive provides the best indication of what
a patient would want in those circumstances. This is a misconception because, when she is
incompetent, she is no longer capable of choice. It does, however, indicate what she would
want contemplating her future situation.
150 One could thus argue on the basis of Cruzan that state living will laws that do not




the existence of the directive and for assuring that it is knowingly
and freely made, but they would not be able to privilege life or
other interests over the substantive content of the competently
made prior directives.
2. Arguments Against Constitutional Recognition of Prior Di-
rectives. The argument against a constitutional right to refuse
treatment in advance distinguishes between current and advance
refusals of medical care and denies that the latter has the same
importance as an exercise of individual autonomy as the former
does.
First, because of differences in immediacy, constitutional recog-
nition of a right to refuse medical care in advance does not neces-
sarily follow from the recognition of a right to refuse care in the
present. The interest in refusing medical care is an interest in
avoiding immediate bodily burdens that will clearly pose burdens
to the patient refusing treatment. The interest in refusing medical
treatment in advance is an interest in exercising control and in be-
ing reassured that certain, speculative situations of medical main-
tenance will not occur.
The interest in making a binding prior directive is thus a present
interest in avoiding a future condition that may never occur. In
contrast to present refusals of treatment, if incompetency does oc-
cur, the person may be unaware of the burdens of the medical
treatment at issue. Moreover, the incompetent patient's interests
may be very different than they appear to a competent person pro-
jecting the future. Indeed, adhering to the advance directive could
harm the incompetent patient because her needs and interests
could be significantly different than the person making the direc-
tive predicted.151
Second, the satisfaction and certainty that arises from control-
ling one's future in this way is not so central to personal autonomy
and identity that it deserves fundamental right status. Because of
the hypothetical nature of the concern, it hardly seems to have the
I Dresser, supra note 105, at 431-32 (offering the two examples discussed in the text).
If a right-or liberty interest-in making an enforceable prior directive were recognized,
questions concerning the standard of scrutiny for restricting that right would still arise. If
the standard of scrutiny is relatively weak, recognition of such a right would not have as
great an impact, and states would remain free to restrict or regulate prior directives to pro.




importance to individuals that decisions over reproduction, educa-
tion of children, religious affiliation, speech and other constitu-
tional rights have. It is simply not so important to individual iden-
tity that it should have protected constitutional status. Thus, a
competent person's interest in controlling future situations of in-
competency lacks the centrality to current interests and identity
that warrants recognition as a fundamental right.
3. Implications of Recognition of Such a Right. Although the
existence of constitutional rights should not necessarily depend on
the consequences of their recognition, it is interesting to examine
the consequences that would follow from constitutional recognition
of a right to make advance directives against medical treatment.
a. State Living Will Policy
If there is a constitutional right to refuse treatment in advance,
then state restrictions on advance refusals will receive the higher
degree of scrutiny accorded to constitutional rights. 52 States would
be presumptively barred from refusing recognition of directives
that apply to nonterminal situations, pregnancy and nutrition and
hydration. They would also be barred from penalizing physicians,
hospitals and others who acted in reliance on what appeared to be
competently made, prior directives against treatment, regardless of
the incompetent patient's condition. All other restrictions in state
living will and durable power of attorney statutes would be subject
to constitutional challenge for improperly limiting the exercise of
that right. While such constraints may sometimes be arbitrarily
imposed and lead to treatment of incompetent patients whose best
interests are served by nontreatment, constitutional constraints
might also impair the ability of the state to protect incompetent
patients from improvidently making advance choices against treat-
ment that end up hurting incompetent patients.1 3
The problem with such an outcome is that the state may be im-
paired in its ability to protect incompetent patients who should be
162 States would be required to meet a heavier burden than rational basis to limit that
right. At the very least, a state would have to show that its regulation did not impose an
"undue burden" on the exercise of the right. In fact, it is possible that a more restrictive
scrutiny would also apply. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
'" Thus, constitutional status may also lead policymakers to conclude that they must
treat indefinitely incompentent patients who have issued directives in favor of treatment,
even if there is no discernible benefit to the patient. See infra note 198.
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treated, for example, in situations where treatment is in the incom-
petent patient's interest. Advance directives serve the interests of
competent persons concerned about their future, not the interests
of patients who are incompetent. 154 Thus, they risk projecting the
competent person's interests into a situation of incompetency, a
situation in which the patient's interests and needs are very differ-
.ent than those previously contemplated. Honoring the directive
could thus harm the incompetent patient, whose situation is now
very different than the person making the directive imagined.
Constitutionalizing advance refusals of medical care could thus
impair efforts by the state to assure that nontreatment does not
harm the incompetent patient's interests. It could lead states to
make no efforts to protect incompetent patients from improvi-
dently made prior directives because the state perceived no con-
flicting interest. Alternatively, it could lead to the invalidation of
statutes that permit physicians to refuse to honor directives that
they think conflict with the incompetent patient's interests.
Constitutionalizing prior directives might also limit the proce-
dures which the state requires for the making of directives to en-
sure informed consent, minimize mistakes and prevent fraud and
abuse. Similar issues with durable power of attorney statutes
would arise: is it enough to designate a proxy with full power or
can the maker be required to specifly the circumstances under
which the designated proxy is to act? In what circumstances will
the state be permitted to regulate such proxy decisions? In short,
there will be confusion and an absence of clear guidelines gov-
erning permissible state action. This confusion may only delay the
adoption of state policies for controlling future medical care
through prior directives. 155
b. Implications Beyond Advance Refusal of Medical Care
If one has a right to refuse medical care in advance, then one
could argue that one also has a right to exercise other constitu-
I Only if the incompetent patient would be treated in the absence of a living will and
such treatment would harm his interests, would enforcement of the prior directive actually
serve the incompetent patient's interests.
"' Note the reverse question: Whether giving the right to have treatment withheld in the
future is actually unconstitutional because it violates the right of the incompetent patient to
have his interests protected once he is incompetent. See supra notes 14-16 (discussing previ-
ous interests versus current interests).
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tional rights in advance as well. The interest in autonomy and cer-
tainty about the future is identical, whatever the particular object
of the directive. Any present right of a competent person should
then be subject to exercise by an advance directive.
If this premise is accepted, two other categories of enforceable
advance directives would arise. The first category involves advance
consent to activities other than treatment refusal in future situa-
tions of incompetency. Thus, a person could give advance consent
to being a subject in medical experimentation, a live donor of bone
marrow or other tissue or organs or even active euthanasia (if ac-
tive euthanasia were legally permitted). The only issue would be
whether the advance consent is given to an activity that is itself
constitutionally protected when the patient is competent. If so,
there is no way to distinguish advance refusals of treatment from
these other activities. 156
The second category of expanded advance directives include ad-
vance control of later situations where the person remains compe-
tent. The autonomy interest in present control of future situations
will exist even though the future situation does not involve incom-
petency. Although one will be able to exercise choice at that future
time, it may often be advantageous and meaningful to exercise that
control in advance. Thus, the interest in exercising control and ac-
quiring certainty may be equally strong whether or not the direc-
tive takes effect at a time of competency or incompetency.
If this observation is true, then people should have a constitu-
tional right to make enforceable directives or contracts regarding
abortion, reproduction, childrearing, surgery and frozen embryos.
The most obvious example is a woman's advance directive, in the
form of a surrogate mother contract, to relinquish custody of a
child she bears for an infertile couple. 157 Another example is a sur-
rogate mother's advance agreement not to abort the pregnancy or
I" Advance directives for postmortem organ donation, autopsy and disposition of prop-
erty also serve the interests of competent persons in exercising autonomy and gaining cer-
tainty about future situations. A crucial difference, however, in these situations, unlike in
cases involving medical treatment, is that at the time that the directive becomes applicable,
the maker will no longer have interests to be protected.
15 The argument that enforcement of such contracts may be constitutionally required on
grounds of the procreative liberty of the infertile couple is presented in Robertson, Em-
bryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59
S. CAL L. REv. 939, 1011-15 (1986).
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to abort it if there is a serious genetic defect.1 58 The disposition of
frozen embryos in case of divorce or death is another subject that
could be agreed upon by an advance directive or contract between
the parties.159 Finally, women who are in high-risk pregnancies
might find it advantageous to give advance consent to performance
of a cesarean section in the event that the physician determines
that the operation is appropriate during labor.6 0
The question of enforcement of advance directives in these re-
productive situations differs from advance refusals of medical
treatment in that the subject of the directive is competent at the
time the directive is to take effect. Indeed, the issue of enforceabil-
ity will arise when the maker of the directive wants to be relieved
of its terms because she later finds the burdens and benefits of the
situation to be different from those she had previously anticipated.
Like Ulysses at the mast, she wants to be free of her previous com-
mitment in order to pursue a different goal. 61 A strong argument
for enforcement remains, however, if the Constitution protects the
right to have advance directives for situations of incompetency
enforced.
In order for competent persons to gain the certainty that they
wish from advance directives, including the participation of others,
they will have to accept that they will be binding in the applicable
situation, even if they subsequently change their minds. In ex-
change, others who rely on their commitment will be willing to
enter into the transaction which the maker finds to be important.
Indeed, the reliance by the other party on the directive makes en-
forcement especially compelling because the other party will have
relied on it and, as a result, may have incurred heavy costs. 10
2
log Id.
"' Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 407
(1990).
160 A physician might ask a woman to agree in advance to undergo a cesarean section if
she deems it necessary, even if the pregnant woman later refuses. See Dresser, Ulysses and
the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 777 (1982).
,' Unlike the situation of Ulysses at the mast, however, the person is not arguably in-
competent to overrule her prior directive as Ulysses was when he heard the siren's song.
102 One example is the couple that entrusts their embryo to a gestational surrogate in
reliance on her promise to return it at birth. If the surrogate is to have opportunities to be a
surrogate, she will have to agree to give up custody at a later time and be willing to have her
agreement enforced. Similarly, enforcing prior agreements for the disposition of frozen em-
bryos gives each party the power to control eventual disposition, even if there is the risk
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4. Should States Recognize Living Wills? The fact that the prin-
ciple underlying the enforcement of advance refusals of medical
care has the above implications should cause one to reconsider
whether a right to refuse treatment in advance should be recog-
nized when the autonomy interest is less compelling than it is in a
present refusal of medical care. If such a right follows from the
right to refuse treatment, then it is difficult to distinguish advance
exercise of many other constitutional rights. The problem that
arises-that the person's interests may be very different than she
previously anticipated and therefore she should not be bound by
the prior directive-also arises with advance refusal of medical
treatment. Once the anticipated situation occurs, the patient's in-
terests may be very different than previously envisaged. This situa-
tion is most clearly presented when the maker is later competent
and objects, but it may also be true when she is incompetent be-
cause her interests may be very different than previously imagined.
Enforcing advance exercises of other constitutional rights thus
shows the problem with the claim that advance refusals of medical
care should be honored.
The most desirable outcome is to avoid constitutionalizing ad-
vance refusals of medical care, so that states will be able to exer-
cise discretion in setting both procedural and substantive limits on
their use. The most desirable compromise between present control
of the future and the future needs of incompetent patients has no
clear constitutional answer. If a constitutional right is not at stake
with every living will, states can take full account of the possible
discrepancies that arise between prior directives and the actual
needs of incompetent patients and fashion a policy that best serves
the needs of each.16 3
C. The Incompetent Patient's Interest in Nontreatment
A third possible constraint on vitalist state policies would arise
in the absence of a present or past competent refusal of medical
treatment. If no obstacle to treatment based on the patient's au-
that they will change their minds and have the agreement enforced against their later
wishes. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
I" In doing so, states will have to confront the issue of whether to adopt the best inter-
ests test or some other test and respect the incompetent patient's interest in treatment or
nontreatment, as the situation demands.
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tonomy can be raised, there is still the question of whether the
mandated treatment harms the incompetent patient.
Unlike Nancy Cruzan, who had no interest in living or dying af-
ter lapsing into a comatose state, conscious incompetent patients
may have substantial interests in how they are treated. A vitalist
policy may often serve their interests in continued life, but when
the treatment is very burdensome and the resulting benefits margi-
nal, vitalist policies may actually harm the patient. 164
In those cases, one could argue that state interventionist policies
are unconstitutional violations of the incompetent patient's liberty.
Incompetent patients retain fourteenth amendment rights to life
and liberty." 5 If they are conscious and capable of suffering, state
policies that require burdensome treatments with little corre-
sponding benefit would deny them liberty. This situation might
arise where an incompetent patient's death is imminent or where
the patient has no interactive existence. Those policies would force
them to undergo procedures that impose great burdens and pro-
duce little benefit. 66
This question is most likely to arise when a state requires that
incompetent patients who have not issued explicit prior directives
against treatment always be treated, such as occurs in states that
reject either a loose substituted judgment test or a current best
interests test.167 Such policies eschew an inquiry into whether
treatment actually serves the patient's current interests; therefore,
physicians, hospitals and courts may conclude that they have no
choice under state law other than to treat the patient. In that case,
family or proxy should argue that the state's vitalist policy is un-
"' The vitalist policy could take the form of a direct prohibition on nontreatment or a
delegation to family of discretion where the family is excessively vitalist. It would also arise
if a state took an extreme vitalist position and required that all patients be treated if there
were no explicit prior directive against treatment, like Missouri did in Cruzan. Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), afl'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
166 Justice Stevens made this point in his dissent. He noted that "[o]ur Constitution pre-
supposes a respect for the personhood of every individual," Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2892 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting), and when he strongly disagreed with the proposition "that chronically
incompetent persons have no constitutionally cognizable interests," id. at 2891.
166 Justice Stevens and others, however, mistakenly viewed gastrostomy feeding as harm-
ing Nancy Cruzan's interests, when her permanent coma prevented her from having inter-
ests in being treated or not being treated. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
67 Missouri and New York, among other states, take this position. See In re Weschester
County Med. Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
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constitutional because it deprives the incompetent patient of her
liberty interest in being free of nonbeneficial, burdensome medical
intrusions.
This argument asserts that the fourteenth amendment requires
states to adopt a current interests test for determining whether
treatment must be provided to incompetent patients who have not
issued explicit directives against treatment. Whether or not reli-
ance on prior explicit or implied wishes is constitutional, the state
is not free to interfere with the bodily integrity of an incompetent
patient in order to preserve life without any corresponding benefit
It must treat that patient with respect, which means determining
whether she truly has interests in treatment and continued life. If
she does not, the state violates the incompetent patient's liberty
when it subjects her to burdensome medical treatment. The state
may not appropriate the body or person of an incompetent con-
scious patient to make a symbolic statement about the importance
of human life when doing so harms the incompetent patient.10 8
D. Constitutional Limits on Prenatal Vitalism
The state's power to take a vitalist position at the end of life
may be contrasted with its power to do so at the beginning of life.
The abortion debate concerns the state's power to protect or pre-
serve all prenatal forms of human life-to take a vitalist position
toward fetuses over the objections of pregnant women. In its most
extreme form, prenatal state vitalism views fertilized eggs, embryos
and fetuses as persons or legal subjects and requires that they be
protected, regardless of the impact on pregnant women and
others." 9
Current constitutional limits on prenatal state vitalism mirror
the limits on state vitalism at the end of life. Under Roe v. Wade,
the state is limited in its prenatal vitalist policies by the woman's
right of bodily integrity-her right to be free of unwanted preg-
'" See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unlike Cruzan, the patient in
this case has real interests in nontreatment that are being violated. Nor does the family's
interest in life justify imposing treatment on an incompetent patient whose best interests
are served by nontreatment.
109 Extreme prenatal vitalism is found in Missouri, Louisiana and Minnesota, which re-
gard the fertilized egg and early embryo as a person or legal subject for many purposes
outside of abortion. See Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 7, at 452 n.7.
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nancy.170 Only when the fetus has reached the advanced stage of
viability (and thus has interests in its own right) may state vital-
ism subordinate the woman's interest in bodily integrity. On the
other hand, if prenatal human life is outside the woman's body,
thus not implicating her bodily integrity, such as embryos created
by in vitro fertilization, then the state is relatively free to take a
very protective position.1 71 The interest in avoiding genetic off-
spring tout court (biological reproduction without any contact or
rearing role with offspring) may not rise to the level of a funda-
mental right, which trumps state vitalism.
This position shares the commitment to bodily integrity that
limits state vitalism at the end of life. As we have seen, a patient's
objection to present or future medical care precludes the state
from imposing on her body. If she is incompetent, her interests
still take priority over state vitalism. The state may adopt vitalistic
policies for chronically ill or dying patients only when it does not
violate their right to bodily integrity, a position similar to the
state's power with regard to prenatal human life.17 2
Thus, Cruzan portends nothing about the future of Roe v. Wade
and abortion. 73 State vitalism in Cruzan is consistent with Roe's
right to end pregnancy because gastrostomy feeding did not in-
trude upon the choice, bodily integrity or other interests of a per-
manently comatose patient. One hopes that the Court would have
ruled differently if the state insisted on treating a conscious incom-
petent patient whose best interests were clearly served by
nontreatment. 74
170 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
I Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 7, at 497-501.
172 Of course, there may be disputes about whether the incompetent patient has any in.
terests at all.
'7 In its recognition of a "liberty interest" rather than privacy, Cruzan is consistent with
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). Moreover, as in Webster,
Justice O'Connor's views about the requisite standard of scrutiny and what is entailed by
"undue burden" will determine the extent to which the state may interfere with the choice
of competent persons to refuse necessary medical treatment. See supra note 132-34 and
accompanying text.
M Johnson, Foes of Abortion View "Right to Die" as Second Battle Over Life and
Death, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1990 § A, at 8, col. 1. Abortion foes also oppose the right to die,
at least as far as it concerns active euthanasia or the withholding of feeding tubes, even In
the presence of an explict directive. They recognize that nontreatment decisions often allow
some other interest to take priority over human life, and that the roots of the right are
found in an unwritten right of privacy in the fourteenth amendment, which implicitly legiti-
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V. CONsTruTIONAL LiTs ON NONVITALIST POLICIES
The discussion has focused on the constitutional limitations on
state policies of vitalism-policies that protect human life regard-
less of its quality or impact on other interests. 17 '5 The state has
wide discretion to adopt vitalist policies, except where a competent
patient's wishes against present or arguably future treatment con-
flict or it could be clearly shown that the policy hurts the patient's
current interests.17 6
Many states, however, reject strict vitalism and adopt policies
toward severely ill, incompetent persons that are decidedly
nonvitalist. Nonvitalist policies may be direct or indirect, and may
run the gamut from prohibitions on funding to broad grants of dis-
cretion to families to have treatment withheld.
In the current stage of policy development, polices that are di-
rectly nonvitalist are rare and generally disapproved. For example,
no state authorizes active euthanasia for incompetent patients, ex-
plicitly permits or requires private and public insurers to withhold
funds from incompetent patients or gives families authority to de-
termine treatment on the basis of the family's need.
On the other hand, state policies that are indirectly nonvitalist
are widespread. The most common examples are laws or court rul-
ings that permit families or proxies to have treatment withheld
from incompetent patients on the basis of their judgment of what
the patient would have chosen if competent.'"7 These rules grant
broad discretion to families, while appearing to serve the interests
of the patient when competent.178 In fact, in some cases, they lead
to decisions against treatment that may not clearly be in the pa-
tient's interest.1 7 9
mates or shares the premises of Roe v. Wade, as Geoffrey Stone notes. Id.
115 A main appeal of vitalism is, of course, that in many instances the patient benefits
from the vitalist policy because she has an interest in further living, which the vitalist policy
protects.
17 This statement is a summary of constitutional limits on state vitalism. Although I
think that courts should adopt this analysis in deciding cases, the statement is not yet a
positive description of what courts in fact do.
'' See supra note 9 and cases cited therein.
18 Supporters of loose substituted judgment may not even be aware of the nonvitalist
import of the test, sincerely believing that they are doing what best serves the patient's
welfare by having family or proxy decide that the patient would have chosen nontreatment
and death if competent.
179 See In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (allowing hospital to discon-
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An important public policy question is whether there are consti-
tutional limits on nonvitalist policies involving incompetent pa-
tients. Nonvitalist policies based on present or past competent re-
fusals of treatment may be justified in terms of autonomy. These
policies are clearly constitutionally permissible and may also be
constitutionally required. If no exercise of autonomy has occurred,
however, can nonvitalism be squared with the respect due incom-
petent patients? Does nonvitalism serve their interests or violate
their rights? To answer these questions, it is important to distin-
guish between nonvitalist policies that affect conscious, incompe-
tent patients and those nonvitalist policies that affect comatose
patients.
A. Policies Affecting Conscious Incompetent Patients
State nonvitalist policies may lead to the termination of neces-
sary medical care for conscious but incompetent patients, thereby
causing their deaths. Since conscious, incompetent patients retain
fourteenth amendment rights to life and liberty, an important
question is whether such policies violate those rights.
The question could be easily answered if the policies took a form
that directly denigrated the life of incompetent patients, for exam-
ple, denying demented patients medical care, defining them as
dead or authorizing active euthanasia of them. Since conscious, in-
competent patients would appear to retain interests in treatment
and further life, such policies would ordinarily deny them their
right to life or liberty. Justifications based on their dependence or
lack of value would not suffice because such justifications would
deny them respect as persons.
But such direct devaluation of incompetent patients is ordinarily
deemed abhorrent and is strictly avoided. Instead, nonvitalist poli-
cies toward conscious incompetent patients take a less direct form.
They operate under the guise of proxy decisions made on the basis
of substituted judgment or best interests. It is important, there-
fore, to address the constitutionality of these approaches as they
relate to decisionmaking for incompetent patients who have not is-
sued explicit directives against treatment.180
tinue kidney dialysis from conscious patient who was suffering from senility and kidney
disease).
80 The assumption is that a nonvitalist outcome based on a competently made prior di.
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1. Substituted Judgment Loosely Construed. A significant body
of ethical and legal opinion argues that the most appropriate deci-
sionmaking procedure for incompetent patients who have not ex-
plicitly issued prior directives against treatment is to permit the
family to decide for the patient based on its view of what the pa-
tient, if competent, would have wanted. This loose substituted
judgment approach, it is argued, is justified by the protective re-
gard and special knowledge of the patient's values and interests
that families have."81 In addition, what the patient would have cho-
sen is usually thought to be the best indicator of what would now
best serve the patient's interests.
While some courts and commentators have questioned the desir-
ability of such an approach, it has generally been assumed that
loose substituted judgment is a policy option that states may, if
they choose, adopt for these decisions. Indeed, the petitioners in
Cruzan argued unsuccessfully that such a test was constitutionally
required to protect the incompetent patients constitutional
rights.1 82
Loose substituted judgment, however, presents several threats to
the welfare of incompetent patients which call its constitutionality
into question. The threats concern the very issues that led the
Court to reject the test as constitutionally required in Cruzan. De-
ciding whether an incompetent patient lives or dies on the basis of
a proxy judgment about what she would have chosen if she were
competent has two major defects. The first defect is that it ignores
the patient's current interests in favor of what she might have de-
cided previously but never in fact did decide. The second defect is
that it gives the proxy no guidance in how to infer the patient's
choice when previously competent, thus making it likely that the
substituted decision will serve the proxy's own interests rather
than the patient's interests.
Regarding the first charge, as noted above, the patient's previous
values and interests are no longer relevant to her because her situ-
ation has changed so drastically. Deciding for the incompetent pa-
rective is constitutionally permissible. For further discussion of this issue, see supra Part
IV(B)(1).
18' The term "loose" is used because there is no requirement of an actual oral or written
expression of views. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1987); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
182 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
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tient on that basis ignores her interests. Indeed, the incompetent
patient's current interests are subordinated not according to a
prior directive, but according to a conception of what she might
have chosen. Since her current situation is so different from her
previous state, it cannot be convincingly claimed that treating her
as if she were still competent respects her as she is now.
The second defect resides in the method by which loose substi-
tuted judgment is implemented. Assuming that prior values and
interests are relevant, the test is not well-structured to discover
them. The family is asked to decide what the patient would have
chosen if she were competent but is given no guidance in choosing
among the several meanings that that capacious phrase might
have.18 3 As a result, the proxy may decide according to what the
proxy would have chosen, to what other competent people might
choose or to what decision would serve the proxy's own interests.
No requirement of actual evidence of past wishes is needed. More-
over, even if some evidence of prior choice exists, it is not clear
how that evidence would be used.
The constitutional challenge arises because a loose substituted
judgment rule gives the family or other proxy the power to decide
whether the patient is treated and lives or whether she is not
treated and dies, without providing for any meaningful check to
ensure that the resulting decisions respect the incompetent pa-
tient's current interests. Indeed, by its very terms, the test shifts
attention to what the patient wanted when she was competent de-
spite the fact that a different set of interests and needs now exist.
There are no or few constraints on how to make this choice. 18'
Two justifications which are often offered for the test are not
persuasive. Proponents cannot claim that the test allows the per-
son's wishes when she was competent to control because the test
does not require actual evidence that the person had previously
183 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13, at 238-39. For example, the Texas Natural
Death Act allows making a nontreatment choice "based on knowledge of what the patient
would desire, if known." Tax. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 672.009(c) (1989).
18 Nor is there any constraint on how the family or proxy should approach determining
what the patient, when competent, wanted. Essentially, it is the proxy's guess and may eas-
ily be confused with what she would want if competent and considering the situation, what
a reasonable person in those circumstances would want or what will serve the family's inter-
ests. The Spring case is an example of how in the guise of determining what the patient
would have wanted, if competent, the family may actually be privileging their own or other
interests. See In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
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chosen this outcome. The fact that she might have chosen it is not
proof that she had chosen it. Moreover, treating her as if she were
still competent is not respectful of her because she is now so
different.
Nor can they persuasively claim that the family's own interest in
deciding these questions justifies depriving the patient of life-life
which would be provided if she never had been competent. The
family of course wants closure and decisional authority, but these
interests hardly seem sufficient to deprive an incompetent patient
of life. If they were, the rule should be stated explicitly that family
discretion is controlling, regardless of the patient's interest in
treatment. That, however, is not the claim made on behalf of sub-
stituted judgment. Indeed, many persons object to family discre-
tion in order to protect the patient from the family's own compet-
ing interests in the outcome.185
How will constitutional challenges to loose substituted judgment
arise? In many cases application of the rule will not be an uncon-
stitutional violation of patient rights because the patient's inter-
ests, in fact, require nontreatment. A challenge will arise only
when the proxy concludes that, if the patient were competent, she
would have rejected treatment, and that conclusion conflicts with
the patient's current interest in being treated. A challenge is thus
likely only when an interested person, such as a healthcare pro-
vider, friend or family member, disagrees with a proxy's substi-
tuted judgment against treatment. At that point the interested
party could argue that the substituted judgment test ignores the
incompetent patient's current interests in being treated and thus
deprives her of her life or liberty without due process of law. Es-
sentially, the party could assert that a best interests determination
is constitutionally required because substituted judgment ignores
the incompetent patient's interests in treatment.180
Whether or not this claim of unconstitutionality can be raised
judicially, state courts and legislatures confronting policy choices
for incompetent patients should heed the conflict between current
'l Such a statute would probably be unconstitutional because it ignores the interests of
the incompetent patient and thus deprives her of life or liberty.
188 They can argue that the patient would have chosen to be treated if competent. In
other words, they could argue that substituted judgment actually is best interest. See Rob-
ertson, Organ Donations By Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76
COLUm L Rv. 48, 68-73 (1976).
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interests and substituted judgment. Given the difficulties in apply-
ing substituted judgment and its irrelevancy to the incompetent
patient, they should adopt policies that directly serve the incompe-
tent patient's interests. If doing so imposes high costs on families
and society, then this conflict should be addressed directly rather
than resolved sub rosa in favor of families through the substituted
judgment test.
2. Best Interests Test. An alternative test for these decisions
would be to focus on the present interests of the incompetent pa-
tient, viewed from her current perspective. Under this test the sub-
stantive criterion for decision would be not what the patient
wanted when she was competent or what a reasonable person
would have wanted, but what serves this patient's interests in her
current situation of illness and permanent incompetency.
The courts have been reluctant to adopt such an approach either
because they have been lured astray by the homage that substi-
tuted judgment appears to pay to autonomy or because they are
troubled by possible consequences of directly assessing patient in-
terests.1 8 7 The test, however, has wide support when the patient
never was previously competent but a decision must be made, as
occurs with pediatric patients and patients who have always been
retarded. 8 It has also received limited recognition from the New
Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy. s9 That court gave impetus
to the test in a case where clear evidence of previous wishes against
treatment was lacking, permitting nontreatment in the absence of
a prior directive to occur only if treatment involved unremitting
pain, a very strict standard indeed. 190
It is likely that some form of the best interest test or other ob-
jective test will be increasingly adopted, particularly as the pitfalls
111 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977) (refusing to talk directly about best interests or quality of life, yet finding nontreat-
ment not to be in patient's interest under the substituted jdugnent doctrine); see also In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
188 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 217-
20.
189 98 N.J. 321, 365, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985) (holding that one of two possible tests for
determining when treatment could be withheld included the decisionmaker's satisfaction
that burdens of patient's continued life with treatment outweigh benefits of life for him).
190 Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13, at 241 (criticizing the holding in In re Conroy for




of the loose substituted judgment test and the rigidities of extreme
vitalism become clear. A best interests approach is the most honest
approach and the one which is most respectful of incompetent pa-
tients. Accordingly, it should inform all aspects of policy for in-
competent patients.""s
There can be no doubt that a best interests test is constitu-
tional.192 It aims to protect the interests of the present incompe-
tent patient, rather than to serve other interests. Indeed, it may be
plausibly claimed that this test is constitutionally required. It aims
to protect the life and liberty of incompetent patients by focusing
on their present interests. In some cases this will require that
treatment be withheld; in others, it will require that treatment be
provided. The decision in each case, however, will be driven by re-
spect for the patient, rather than for other interests.
However, one might raise constitutional objections to particular
ways of implementing the best interests test. For example, one
could challenge a procedure which allowed the proxy to determine
treatment solely on her view of the patient's best interests because
it is too prone to erroneous determination of that interest. That
challenge, however, goes to implementation, not to the substantive
standard being applied. As long as the implementing procedure is
reasonably designed to determine and protect the patient's inter-
ests, it should be constitutional.
1 93
3. Privileging Other Interests Over Those of the Patient. The
most difficult policy questions will arise in situations involving con-
scious, incompetent patients who have some slight interest in fur-
ther treatment but where treatment would be burdensome for the
patient's family, taxpayers or others. The advantage of loose sub-
stituted judgment is that it permits nontreatment to occur without
confronting this conflict. On the other hand, if a best interests test
,9, Id. at 242-43.
192 Justice Stevens' comments in his dissent about how "chronically incompetent persons
have.., constitutionally cognizable interests .. ." support this idea and even suggest that
protecting the best interests of incompetent patients may be constitutionally required.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2891 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Rhoden's recommendation that the family have the presumptive right to decide, un-
less the physician challenges their decision, is partially helpful. See Rhoden, supra note 104.
Her position, however, is based on the family's deciding according to what the patient would
have chosen if competent, not the patient's current best interests. Furthermore, this posi-
tion gives too much discretion to the family.
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is followed, the conflict will inevitably arise.19 4
One can make a strong policy argument that, in marginal or
close cases, interests of other people may take priority over the in-
terests of the incompetent patient.195 Strictly speaking, the patient
has some interest in treatment, such as in cases where further
treatment is not harmful and she gains some additional, conscious
life. If the additional life is of very marginal quality and the bur-
dens to family and others are great, however, one could reasonably
accept a nonvitalist outcome. The explicit judgment would be that
human life in such a diminished state need not be maintained if
there are significant costs involved. Indeed, many people might
share this view, even if they are reluctant to enshrine this opinion
in statutory criteria.
Would such a policy be constitutional? That is, does an incom-
petent patient with marginal interests in living have a constitu-
tional right to life and liberty that would require that treatment
continue, regardless of burdens on others? In defining the constitu-
tional rights of incompetent persons, the courts should allow states
some leeway for such valuation if a state wishes to adopt such a
nonvitalist approach. Only where the interests in further living are
very clear and substantial should the state be prevented from
withholding treatment in such marginal cases. 96 While this is
hardly a definitive answer and may pose other problems, it is a
place to start the debate over the principles and policy that this
issue raises. Ultimately we must confront the value of greatly di-
minished human life relative to other interests and the question of
whether a patient-centered approach, even in marginal cases, must
always be strictly followed.
B. Nonvitalist Policies When the Patient Is Irreversibly
Comatose
Nonvitalist policies are much less likely to be found unconstitu-
"I Thus, economic considerations could lead to restricting public and private insurance
payments for such patients when their interests are truly marginal. If the state, however,
had a strong interest in continued life, the state would not be able to enact "a policy
designed to ensure quick and comfortable deaths by denying treatment to categories of mar-
ginal hopeless cases" out of concern for quality of life. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2891 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
195 Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13, at 241-42.
'" In that case the rights of the incompetent patient would take priority.
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tional when they are applied to irreversibly comatose patients.
Such policies could take the form of allowing family or proxy to
decide about treatment on any basis, including their own interest;
in having state or private insurers withhold payment for mainte-
nance of such patients; or adopting a cognitive death definition of
brain death.
The constitutionality of these policies depends upon whether ir-
reversibly comatose patients are still considered persons under the
Constitution, and if they are, whether they have interests that re-
quire respecting their right to life. A reasonable position would be
to find that they are legal persons but lack interests that need pro-
tection from state nonvitalist positions.
1. Nontreatment of Irreversibly Comatose Patients. The most
likely nonvitalist policy with regard to comatose patients are state
rules that allow treatment to be withheld from them when the
family requests it. Except for Missouri, most states that have dealt
with the issue have permitted nontreatment.9 This position is
likely to enjoy the wide support of ethical and legal commentators.
Whether based on loose substituted judgment, the patient's cur-
rent best interests or the discretion of families alone, such state
policies would appear to be constitutional because they do not de-
prive the comatose patient of an interest in continued life or lib-
erty. When all cognitive and sapient function is irretrievably lost,
it is a reasonable judgment that the patient has lost the capacity to
have interests at all. As argued above, neither sustaining the coma-
tose patient through treatment or causing her death through non-
treatment harms the patient. Permanently comatose means that
the patient is permanently past the ability to be harmed. This
judgment should be constitutionally permissible even if there is no
prior directive for that result.
2. Withholding Public or Private Insurance. State policies that
deny irreversibly comatose patients welfare benefits or publicly
funded medical care or that permit private insurers to withhold
such funds should also be constitutional. Although no state has yet
taken this position, it is likely eventually to be discussed as a
money-saving option for public policy.
197 See, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 195, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, (1988);
McConnell v. Beverly Enter.-Conn., Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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Consider an equal protection challenge to such laws by a family
that holds strong vitalist views and wants their comatose daughter
maintained as long as possible. Would denial of funds violate the
comatose patient's right to equal protection or the family's right to
have their needy children protected to the same extent as other
dependent persons?198
The equal protection challenge should fail because the state is
trying to conserve its medical funds on the rational ground that
comatose patients no longer have interests to be protected. Since
the state may refuse to fund certain medical procedures when
there is a rational ground of difference, it should be able to with-
hold funds from permanently comatose patients because they have
no meaningful interest in life.199 The comatose patient's lack of in-
terest in further treatment would appear to be a rational ground of
difference. If comatose patients can be denied treatment altogether
because they lack interests in treatment, they could be denied pub-
lic funds for that treatment as well.
Just as the patient has no right to publicly funded treatment,
the family does not have any inherent right to publicly funded
treatment for their comatose relative. They merely have a right to
have the state make rational distinctions, in its funding decisions.
A state's judgment that comatose patients have no interest in fur-
ther living, despite their family's objections, is rationally based-if
it were not, then comatose patient's could never have treatment
withheld. 200 Thus the state may adopt a nonvitalist policy with re-
198 A variation on this problem has arisen in the Wanglie case in Minneapolis, in which
the family of an 87-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state has opposed efforts of
the physicians and hospital to terminate all treatment for her on the ground that it is futile.
Although the issue is not presented as one of state policy concerning medical funding, but
rather whether the patient has a right to be treated at all on the basis that the family
believes treatment is what she would choose, if competent, the issue is similar. See Belkin,
As Family Protests, Hospital Seeks an End to Woman's Life Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10,
1991, § A, at 1, col. 1.
199 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1980), which allowed states to choose
not to fund certain medically necessary abortions), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (denying right to publicly financed hospital services for
nontherapeutic abortions), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 888 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (denying right to Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions).
200 If it is not rational to withhold funding from them, then it is not rational to withhold
other forms of treatment. Either they have an interest in living or they do not. If they do
not, then they need not be funded. If they do, then treatment must be provided as well as
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gard to public and private funding of treatment for permanently
vegetative patients.
3. Defining Irreversible Coma as Brain Death. Finally, a state
might choose to define the irreversibly comatose as brain dead.
Current definitions of brain death require that there be total cessa-
tion of all brain activity, including brain stem function.201 Thus co-
matose patients are not brain dead. Although they lack cortical
functioning and thus have no cognitive or sapient ability, they still
have lower or brain stem activity.
Some persons have argued that cortical death is the death of the
person and thus should be included within the definition of brain
death.20 2 What would be the implications of a state's adopting this
approach, choosing to regard cortical death as death for all pur-
poses? Whatever the policy arguments against such a position, it is
difficult to see that it would be unconstitutional. If permanently
comatose patients lack interests in treatment and living, then it
matters little whether we deem them dead or whether we permit
nontreatment to bring about total brain death (though it might
have implications for the many situations in which a clear moment
of death is crucial). The outcome is the same for the patient.
Therefore, a definitional approach to the irreversibly comatose
would be within state power despite strong policy reasons against
adopting such a position. 03
CONCLUSION
Public policy for treatment of incompetent patients ultimately
concerns the choice of a location on the vitalist-nonvitalist contin-
equal access to public funding made available for other dependent persons. The only excep-
tion would be if an explicit prior directive against treatment were permitted to take over the
incompetent-in this case, comatose-patient's interests. See supra note 197.
'0' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION. DEFINING DEATH. MEDICAL, LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE
DETERMINATION OF DEATH (1981).
202 Green & Wilder, Brain Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHIL & PUBL AFFAIRS 105
(1980); Veatch, The Whole-Brain Oriented Concept of Death: An Out-moded Philosophical
Formulation, 3 J. THANATOLOGY 13 (1975).
203 As a corollary, the comatose patient could be used as a source of organs or as a subject
of experimentation because she would have no interests to be harmed, though there are
symbolic and other policy objections to such a practice. The controversy over the use of
anencephalic infants as organ donars before they are brain dead raises similar issues. See
Robertson, Relaxing the Death Standard for Organ Donation in Pediatric Situations, in




uum of respect for human life. That choice, however, is mediated
by concerns with autonomy, family interests and other factors.
Rarely is it addressed directly.
The Cruzan case is significant because it indicated some of the
constitutional constraints that attend decisional policies for incom-
petent patients. In requiring gastrostomy feeding of an irreversibly
comatose woman against her parents' wishes, Missouri took an ex-
treme vitalist position. Although the symbolic benefits sought from
such a position do not, in my view, justify the costs to her family,
the case was correctly decided as a matter of constitutional law.
Because the patient was irreversibly comatose and had not clearly
issued a prior directive against treatment, Missouri's extreme vital-
ism was within the constitutional power of the state.
Limits on state vitalism, however, would arise if state policies
conflict or interfere with the considered choices of competent indi-
viduals or injure incompetent patients who have no clear interest
in the treatment at issue. They may also interfere with a right to
issue advance directives against medical care when incompetent, if
such a right is recognized. °4 The state is free to adopt vitalist poli-
cies as long as those policies do not directly harm patients or over-
ride competently made choices.
States which take a less vitalist approach also face constitutional
constraints when they permit incompetent persons to be denied
medical treatment essential to serve their interests. Such limits
would arise if state policies allow nontreatment of incompetent pa-
tients-based on the interests of family and proxy, or on a determi-
nation of what the patient might have chosen if she were compe-
tent, and the patient's current interests clearly require treatment.
On the other hand, nonvitalist policies toward irreversibly coma-
tose patients face few constitutional limits because such patients
have no meaningful interests that can be harmed.
This analysis of Cruzan has thus brought us to questions of state
vitalism beyond those presented in that case. The first issue was
whether a comatose patient such as Nancy Cruzan had interests
20 I have argued against recognition of a constitutional right to have advance directives
enforced. See supra Part IV(B)(2). If a state nevertheless chooses to respect prior directives
(as most no doubt will), it should be aware of the possible conflicts that can arise with the




that were violated by continued treatment. The conclusion that
she had no present interests in the treatment decision raised a sec-
ond question: whether the state was obligated to treat her accord-
ing to how she might have preferred to be treated when she was
competent. Such an obligation would exist, if at all, only if she had
explicitly directed that treatment be stopped if she were incompe-
tent-a decision not clearly established in the Cruzan record.
The investigation thus led to an analysis of what the rights and
interests of incompetent patients are more generally and, by impli-
cation, the rights of competent persons in controlling future situa-
tions of incompetency. Although irreversibly comatose patients
have no interests, conscious, incompetent patients do have inter-
ests, which, depending on the circumstances, may require that
treatment be provided or that treatment be withheld. A key point
of this Article is that respect for incompetent persons requires fo-
cusing on their present interests and welfare, not on the interests
and values they had when they were competent. To allow infer-
ences about previous values to control, when the person's situation
has changed so radically, risks denying incompetent patients the
respect to which they are entitled.
This focus on the present interests of incompetent patients thus
calls into question the common tendency to treat the incompetent
patient in terms of what she previously had or would have chosen,
rather than in terms of her current state. Whatever the reasons for
this distortion, the critical point is the fact that a conflict may
arise between current interests and previous interests or choices.
When current interests conflict with an explicit prior directive,
the choice lies between the competent person's wish to exercise
control over the future and the person's interests when incompe-
tent. When a directive has not been issued and a proxy is inferring
what the patient may have chosen if she had thought about it,
then a competent person's interest in exercising autonomy is not at
issue. Autonomy has not been exercised. The argument for ignor-
ing the patient's current interests is weak when there is no explict
prior directive.
This Article thus argues that a best interests test for assessing
treatment decisions for conscious, incompetent patients offers
them the greatest respect, while substituted judgment, particularly
its loose version, risks denying them respect by ignoring their pre-
sent interests. It follows then that the current best interests test is
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both constitutionally permissible and constitutionally required, at
least where substituted judgment or other approaches ignore sub-
stantial current interests in treatment. Other approaches would be
unconstitutional if they deny incompetent patients the treatment
or nontreatment to which respect for their current welfare entitles
them.
This conclusion leaves us with the problem of determining
whether conscious, incompetent patients have substantial (or, in-
deed, any) interests in treatment. How can the interests of con-
scious, incompetent patients be determined? Is there a presump-
tion that any conscious life is in their interests, or must more be
shown, such as actual interactive experiences with others? Should
family or proxy make this choice? What checks on the the assess-
ment of patient interests are needed?205
These questions bring us to the crux of the matter: what is the
meaning or value of diminished human life to the incompetent pa-
tient, and how is it to be determined? This is the normative issue
that arises in every treatment decision for incompetent patients.
Only by facing -this question directly can it be adequately
answered. 0
Respect for the incompetent patient's interests may require substantial procedural
protections in assessing those choices. See Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional "Right
to Die'? When is There No Constitutional "Right to Live'?, 25 GA. L. REv. 1203 (1991).
206 Although I conclude this Article without showing how one might approach answering
this question, it is not unanswerable. Indeed, there is probably a large area of consensus
about certain very diminished states of existence which do not serve the patient's interests,
while there is disagreement over many others. The task now is to begin to try to answer that
question, as I hope to do in subsequent work. For an account of how one might begin to deal
with these questions, see Dresser & Robertson, supra note 13, at 240-43.
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